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About the Author 
W. S. WOYTINSKY has been one of the leading economists of the Western 
world for nearly four decades. Trained at St. Petersburg University before 
World \Var I, he worked in Berlin and Geneva before coming to the United 
States in 1935. Here he has served the Federal Government (in various 
capacities) as well as several private research orgainzations and Johns 
Hopkins University. An extended tour of South Asia led to a 1956 NEW 
LEADER series on "India: Awakening Giant," 
later published in book form by Harper's. An 
eight-month research and lecture tour of Latin 
America is responsible for this booklet. 
Born in St. Petersburg in 1885, Woytinsky 
as a student became a member of the Russian 
Social Democratic Labor party. Though at first 
he sympathized with the Bolshevik wing led by 
Lenin, he assumed an independent position be-
fore World War I. Imprisoned by the Tsarist 
Government in 1908, he wrote a highly influen-
tial novel on prison life, then spent nine years 
in Siberian exile. Liberated in the March 1917 
WOYTINSKY democratic revolution, he served the moder-
ate Provisional Government before Lenin's 
seizure of power and the independent Social Democratic Government of 
Georgia until its conquest by Lenin's forces in 1922. An economic writer in 
Berlin from 1922 to 1928, he was director of statistics for the German 
General Federation of Labor during the last five years of the Weimar 
Republic, then worked for a year with the International Labor Office in 
Geneva. While in Germany, he produced a seven-volume encyclopedia of 
statistics, The World in Figures. 
Dr. Woytinsky's U.S. Government service includes work with the Cen-
tral Statistical Board (1934-35) and seven years as principal consulting 
economist to the Social Security Board (1941-1947). Between 1935 and 
1941, he worked with the committee on social security of the Social Science 
Research Council. In 1947, Dr. Woytinsky became research director of the 
Twentieth Century Fund and research professor of economics at Johns 
Hopkins University. 
Among his books are Social Consequences oj the Economic Depression, 
Labor in the United States, Three Aspects oj Labor Dynamics, Earnings 
and Social Security in the United States, and Employment and Wages in the 
United States. \Vith his wife, E. S. Woytinsky, he wrote World Population 
and Production and World Commerce and Government. 
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FOREWORD 
THIS is a report on the eight-month trip my wife and I took to Latin America in 1957-58, under the auspices of the 
State Department exchange of specialists program. We visited 
15 countries: Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, Chile, Argen-
tina, Uruguay, Brazil, Puerto Rico, Haita, Jamaica, Cuba, Mexi-
co, Guatemala and El Salvador. We lectured or held seminars, 
round-table discussions and conferences in 36 cities, including 
most of the university centers south of the Rio Grande. In all 
these cities we met with economists, Government officials, 
journalists, businessmen and labor leaders. The U. S. Em-
bassies, Consulates, ICA missions, information services and 
binational institutes generously helped us in establishing con-
tacts with local people and gathering printed materials. Local of-
ficials and intellectuals were equally generous in the frankness 
with which they discussed their problems with us. We did not 
resent their criticism of U. S. policy; they did not resent our 
criticism of the policy of their governments. 
I would like to use this opportunity to express, in the name 
of my wife and myself, our warm gratitude to all who helped us 
in the Latin American countries. Their friendliness and hos-
pitality made our trip a unique experience. 
-We S. Woytinsky 
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PEO!PLE IN LIMA (above) ARE 9 TIMES RICHE·R THAN PERU·S VILLAGERS 
1. Economic Progress 
Poverty and Abundance: In Latin America, as in SDutheast Asia, eeD-
nnmic prDgress has ,become a part 'Of :the drive fnr natiDnal ,independence and 
dignity; industrializatiDn seems to' be Aladdin's lamp, the cure fDr lall evils. 
But Latin America differs frnm SDutheast Asia in histDrical and eultural 
background and in the level Df its eCDnomic develDpment. 
The poverty of the peDple is hidden behin'd the glittering faQade Q1f mag-
nificent Latin American cities. Peru is among the pDorest cD~ntries Df the 
area in terms of per capita income, but Lima is among its mDst glamDrDus 
capitals. TO' appraise the depth of pDverty in Latin America Dne does not 
have to' gO' to' remDte villages in the uplands Df the Andes Dr in the jungles 
of the upper Amazon. Sometimes, nDt far from the capital, poverty-stricken 
villages hang -on rocky slDpes along a verdant valley dDminated by prDud 
eastle-like mansions; sDmetimes they are lost in swamps between ·fertile hills 
where orchards and gardens surround IDvely haciendas. 
Many cities are eneircled -by indescribable slums. ArDund Buenos Aires, 
the slums are separated frDm the eity by a fDrtress-like wall; we drDve alDng 
it, but were advised by local friends not to' trespass in that wDrld of misery. 
In the nDrthwest part of South Amerioa-CDIDmbia, Ecuador, Peru and 
BDlivia-misery overflDws intO' the central parts of the cities frDm adjacent 
native markets and streets, where Indians in rags trDt with heavy IDads Doll 
their shoulders and women carry their children like bundles Df pDtatDes. HeFe 
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misery as veiled by a psychological curtain: The city people do not notice 
it, and the tourists record it as part of the local color. 
Latin American economists are, of course, aware of the poverty of the 
indigenous population but disagree among themselves as to what to do about 
it. Along with eloquent champions of the Indians, we met experts who 
claimed that the natives do not count in the national economy because they 
create nothing, save nothing and invest nothing but simply consume the 
produce of their soil. The problem, they assured us, is how to keep these 
people outside the city limits, letting in only those needed for economically 
sound purposes. 
Per Capita Income: A verages fail to give a clear picture of the living 
conditions of Latin American people. Some countries have no reliable 
statistics; others, such as Brazil, Argentina, Chile and Colombia, have dif-
ferent exchange rates for various transactions in foreign currency and there 
is no accurate way to convert local money into U. S. doHars. When the free-
market exchange rates are used, national income appears too low; if 
preferential rates art; accepted, it m.ay be overstated. Yet the latter method 
has been accepted by the United Nations Commission for Latin America, and 
I have used it in Table I below. ./ ' 
With reservations for a considerable margin of error and some appalling 
inconsistencies (for example, the high per capita income in the Dominican 
Republic and Guatemala as compared with Mexico, or in Cuba and Colombia 
as compared with Brazil), per capita income for Latin America averaged 
$240 in 1950, the last year for which more or less comparable data are 
available. This amount compared favorably with Eastern Europe, ap-
proached the level of Italy, and was four to five times that of India and 
I. Per Capita and Total National Income, 1950 
.Countries 
Per Capita 
Income 
Venezuela 
Argentina .. . .. . . .. .. . .. . .. . . . ...... . 
Uruguay ... ... ..... . .... ... . ..... . . . 
Chile ... • ... . ... . ....... . . .... . .. . .. 
Cuba . . ..... . . . . , . . ....... . . .. .. .. .. . 
Colo~bia .. . -.. ... . .. . .. . ....... . . . .. . 
Panama ; . . .. .. .. . ... . . . .. . . .. . . .. . . . 
Brazil . . ..... .. . . .. . .. . ....... . .. . . . . . 
Dominican Republic ... . ..... . . . ..... . 
Guatemala ... . ......... ... .. . ... . .. . 
Ecuador-- ... .. ........ . .. .. ..... . ... . 
Costa · Rica, EI Salvador, Honduras .. . . . 
Mexico . .. ........ . .. . .. . .......... . 
Peru, Haiti ..... ... . . . . ...... . ... . 
Paragu·ay,. Nicaragua , Bolivia .. . . . .... . 
Source : UN Statistical Yearbook, 1957. 
$480 
$395 
$395 
$350 
$290 
$255 
$240 
$210 
$165 
$150 
$130 
$125 
$115 
$ 95 
$ 90 
Population National Income, 
in Millions in Millions 01 $ 
4.9 2,400 
17.2 5,070 
2.4 710 
6.1 2,120 
5.5 1,600 
11.1 2,850 
.8 190 
51.9 10,560 
2.1 350 
2.8 420 
3.2 410 
4.1 510 
25.8 3,OO() 
11.6 1,100 
5.5 480 
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SCENE IN A MOUNTAIN VILLAGE IN COLOMBIA 
the :Middle East. On the other hand, it lagged far behind per capita income 
in Western Europe, the United States, Canada and Australia. 
In terms of per capita income, single Latin American nations range from 
a standard of living nearly as low as India's to a level similar to that of 
France. What is chaIiacteristic of La1tin America is not low average income 
(which might ,be the result of technical backwardness), but extreme con-
trasts in the distribution of the social product among different groups of 
the population (which is a social, rather Ithan ,technical, problem). 
Peru illustrates this point. Out of its total population of 8.5 million, 
about one million live in Lim'a, which in 1950 absorbed ,about 55 per cent of 
the national income and had a per capita income close to, $445, as oompared 
with $50 in the rest of the nation. Generally, rich people in Latin America 
enjoy ahout the same comforts and luxuries as the rich in the United States. 
I:f they have less cash, they employ more servants. 
In hrief, Latin America ,today is neither "poor" nor "underdeveloped." 
Rather, it should be described as an unevenly developed area, with the 
villages lagging far behind the big cities. This difference in description 
suggests different approaches to the fundamental problem which the area 
is facing. If it were an underdeveloped area like India, its immediate task 
would ,be to develop all sectors of the economy, without giving particular 
priority to any 'One of them. Perhaps it would be advisable, fOT praotioal 
reasons, to start with industry and shift later to agriculture. But, since the 
present characteristic of Latin America is the striking contrast between 
abundance and pGverty, its most urgent task is to reduce this CGntrast by 
stimulating the development of the most backward sectors of its economy. 
Industrialization: Most of the people in Latin America make their living in 
agriculture and husbandry, but the distribution of the lab'Or fGrce by broad 
ecGnomic sectors is changing gradually. Employment in manufacturing, con-
struction and especially services (including trade) is growing more rapidly 
than employment in the villages. According ,to the Economic Commission for 
a 
Latin America, the labor force In the area has been distributed In the fol-
lowing percentages: 
1945 
Agricultu re . .. . ............ .. .. .... 56.2 
Manufacturing and mining ........... /5.1 
Construction . .................... .. 3./ 
Services ........................... 23.2 
Unknown and not specified ..... .. .... 2.3 
1955 
50.7 
15.7 
3.7 
27.6 
2.4 
Source: UN Eco nomic Bulletin for Latin America, San tiago, Chile, February 1957. 
While the total labor force increased by 13.1 million between 1945 and 
1955, only 4.1 million additional workers were absorbed by agriculture while 
9 million found occupation in non-agricultural pursu~ts. Nevertheless, agricul- . 
ture · still absorbs more than three times as many workers as manufacturing 
and mining combined. 
The distribution of the labor force among economic sectors varies widely 
from country to country. Agriculture employs from 50 to 70 per cent of 
the force in most Latin American republics, more than 70 per cent in Haiti, 
Honduras and Guatemala, and less than 30 per cent in Chile, Argentina and 
Uruguay. Only the last three nations can be described as agricultural-indus-
trial. All the others should be classified as primarily agricultural countries. 
A very different pattern appears in the distribution of national income 
by industrial origin. According to the Economic Commission for Latin 
II. Percentage Distribution of the Labor Force 
Manufactur-
Counfry Agriculture ing & Mining Construction Services . Unknown 
Haiti .. . . . . .. . .. .. 77.4 6.6 0.8 11.5 3.7 
Honduras . . ....... 75.7 8./ 1.9 1/.0 3.3 
Guatemala . .. . .... 74.8 8.4 2.0 11.6 3.2 
Nicaragua .... ... . 69.7 11.6 2.5 /6.2 
Dominican Republic 69.7 8.1 2.7 /7.5 2.0 
EI Salvador .. . ..... 64.2 11.3 2.8 18.5 3.2 
Bolivia .. . .... . . .. . 63.3 14.9 2.5 /8.4 0.9 
Brazil ... .. ....... . 61.1 13.5 3.9 21.2 0.3 
Peru ........... . .. 58.8 16.9 2.9 19.6 1.8 
Paraguay .......... 58.3 15.6 2.7 20.8 2.6 
Mexico ...... . ..... 57.8 13.2 2.8 21.8 4.4 
Colombia ... . .. . .. 56.4 /5.9 3.1 21./ 3.5 
Costa Rica . ..... 56.4 10.9 4.1 25.7 2.9 
Panama .. . ..... . . 54.9 7.2 2.6 25.7 9.6 
Ecuador .. .. ... .. . 50.9 23.5 2.2 /9.1 4.3 
Cuba ........... . . 43.8 /6.0 2.7 36.6 0.9 
Venezuela .. . . ... . . 41.2 12.7 5.4 32.3 8.4 
Chile ... .. . . ... . 29.8 23.3 5.5 37.6 3.8 
Argentina .. .. . .... 24.7 23.4 6.1 43.7 2.3 
Uruguay .. .. . .. .. . 21.7 23.9 4.3 46.4 3.7 
Source: UN EcoDomic Bulletin for Latin America, Santiago, Chile, February 1957. 
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America, the gross product of the area was distributed by economic sectors 
as follows (in percentages) : 
Agriculture .... . . . . .. . . . .. . .. . . .... . . . . . .... . . . ... . .... 24.5 
Manufacturing and mining . . . .......... . ... . . .. ... . . ... 22.5 
Construction . .. . . . . ... ..... . .. . . ... . .. . . ... . . . ...... . . . 4.6 
Services . .. ... . . . .. . ... .. ..... . ..... . ........ .. ........ 44.4 
Housing, rent .. .. ...... . .. . ..... . . . . . .. .... . .... . . .. . . . 4.0 
The disparity between the shares of agricultur,al and non-agricultural pur-
suits in employment and national produot is described by the UN Com-
mission as a ·difference in productivity of labor. It could more properly be 
interpreted as an indication of the exploitation of rural areas by the cities. 
Mo·reover, a large part-probably two-thirds or three-fourths--of the income 
originated in agriculture is consumed in the cities as the profits of absentee 
land owners. This is one of the causes of the striking contrast between the 
rich and the poor in this area. 
Despite the predominance o·f agriculture in the economy of Latin America, 
some regions in Brazil, MexicO', Argentina and Chile have reached a high 
level of industrial development. There one sees large factories equipped with 
the most modern machinery. On the other hand, industrial activity in re-
mote corners of Latin America is concentrated in small shops reminiscent 
of the 18th-century workshops in the United States and Western EurDpe. 
In general, Latin America presents all eCDnomic patterns, from primitive 
hoe-agriculture and colonial-type plantations to modern capitalism. Thatched 
huts and cave-like adobe dwellings are as charaoteristic of the local scenery 
as the ultra-modern skyscrapers of Sao Paulo, RiD de Janeiro, Buenos Aires 
and Mexico City. 
The present share of the area in the world industrial economy is rather 
modest. According to the Statistical Office of the United Nations, all of 
Latin America accounted for 3.4 per cent of world manufactures in 1953 (the 
total excludes the countries of the Soviet ,bloc), as compared with 3.5 per 
cent fDr Italy, 3.6 per cent for Cana1da, 4.6 per cent for France, 7.9 per cent 
fDr Western Germany, 8.4 per cent tor the United Kingdom and 54.0 
per cent for the United States. The net per capita value of industdal output 
(value added by processing) for the whole area was close to' $35. Countries 
with higher than average per capita output were: Argentina ($85), Venezuela 
($59), MexicO' ($41) and Colombia ($39). However, Chile ($29) and 
Br,azil ($25) were somewhat below the average. In other parts of the area, 
the rate ranged between $10 and $20. These rates are fairly high in com-
parison with those for Asia or Africa, but very low in comparison with 
the United States ($600) and Canada ($440). 
This contrast might seem to justify the efforts of local governments to 
promote rapid industrializ1ation: They believe that, in order to catch up 
with the mOore prosperous powers, their countries must start to run before 
they have learned to walk. However, with full sympathy for the efforts of 
Brazil or Mexico to become great industri'al powers-which they , most 
certainly will become some day-and with an understanding of the less 
ambitious dreams of industriali~atiO'n of Chile, Colombia and sO'me smaller 
10 
A MODERN PLANT, THE VOLTA REDONDA STEE,L MILL IN BRAZIL 
Latin American countries, one may doubt whether rapid industrialization 
is their most urgent need. After all, most of them have learned to process 
the staple articles consumed by the masses of their population. What they 
lack lare factories to produce the finer articles which only the wealthy minority 
o£ their people can afford, and the mills to produce machinery for such 
factories. This may be a gap in their economic system, but it is by no 
means as serious as the backwardness of local agriculture and the misery 
in the villages. 
Rate of Progress: How far have the Latin American nations succeeded in 
their efforts to accelerate industrialization? The UN Statistical Office esti-
mates that per capita industrial production increased 40 per cellit in Latin 
America from 1948 to 1957, as compared , with 42 'per cent for North 
America, 75-80 per cent for Europe and 'about 150 per cent for Asia and the 
Middle East. Thus the rate of industrial growth in Latin America has just 
about kept pace with that in the United States, a nation that is no longer 
in the phase of progressive industrializ,ation but has entered the stage in 
which industrial expansion lags behind the growing production o-f services. 
Moreover, it should be pointed out ,that the growth of manufactures has 
been very unevenly distributed in Latin America. Apart from Peru, where 
industrialization started from a very low level so Ithat its percentage gain 
in production is meaningless, per capita industrial output rose at an annual 
rate of about 5 per cent in Brazil and Mexico in the 1947-57 decade and' 2.5 
per cent in Chile, while it steadily declined in Argentina. 
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Changes in natiDnal inCDme reveal a similar pattern. The periDd 1948-55 
brDught gains Df 20 to. 25 per cent in real per capita incDme in Brazil, Mexico. 
and CDlombia, practically no. gain in Chile and a net IDSS Df 11 per cent 
in Argentina. The conclusion is inescapable that Latin American cDuntries 
have not been tDD successful in their attempt to. start running befDre learning 
to. walk. 
2. The Colonial Heritage 
W HY IS IT THAT the Spanish cDlonies in the South of the Western Hemisphere, which once were economically far ahead Df the British 
colonies in the North, have fallen behind? Why is it that even now the 
South cannot come closer to the North, despite its abundance of natur~l 
resources, the high quality of its population, the competence of its economists, 
architects and engineers, and the effDrts of its governments? The distribu-
tio.n of roDnomic power in our hemisphere changed drastically in the century 
that elapsed between the Latin American wars for independence and World 
War I. 
In terms of accumulated wealth, large cities, ports, established foreign 
trade and even the technical equipment of plantations, the liberated Spanish 
co.lonies prohably had a better start than the United States and Canada. But, 
because Df the deep difference between Spanish and British colDnization, 
liberation did no.t mean the same thing in the two. areas. 
The British cQlonies in the North were founded by settlers who came to 
the New World from England and other parts of Northwestern EurDpe in 
search of a place to. live, relying Dn their own efforts. Once free from foreign 
tutelage, responding to. the challenge of the austere environment, they es-
tablished an essentially plebeian sDciety on virgin So.il. Molding the new 
nations required compromising divergent interests and ideas. The U. S. 
and Canada did nDt embody all the golden dreams of the early pioneers, 
but they did go. farther tDward realizing aspirations for individual freedom 
and equality than other nations then existing. Special privileges for the 
rich were not completely abolished but were checked in time by the people, 
and opportunity for all was prDtected by law and oustom. Whatever the 
£laws in the governments o.f the two natiDns, they maintained the spirit of 
hard work and a relentless drive fDr imprDvement ,in the people. 
In contrast, the wars fDr independence in Latin America were essentially 
revolts of looal (Creole) ruling classes against the ·appointees of the Spanish 
Crown, who. appropriated the lion's share Df the produce Df the subjugated 
land and people. Of course, along with the aristDcrats, humble peDple were 
in the ranks Df the independence armies just as other humble people fought 
under the Spanish banp.er. Some leaders of the independence movement were 
open to. the liberal ideas orf their time, but most o.f them had no quarrel with 
the colonial socio-econDm,ic system. The Spanish triad-the rich landowner, 
priest and professional soldier-stood at the top of the social pyramid, 
native serfs, imported slaves and oommon workers at the bDttom. The inde-
pendence leaders perpetuated this system in their new republics. They had 
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no lear of oppositiDn from the lower classes; the backbone of their resistance 
had been broken by bloody repression of Indian revolts before the wars 
lor independence. Thus, the young Latin American republics inherited the 
rigid social stratification estahlished by colonial masters, a system which 
prDvided the upper classes with all sorts Df cDmforts and privileges, leaving 
the masses of the people only the blessing of pDverty. The monolith of the 
Spanish colonial empire was shattered, but its spirit remained alive. 
A society hased on such a foundation tends to consider manual work dis-
tasteful and, to SOlllle extent, this applies to all economic activities except those 
reserved for the hereditary aristocracy. A nobleman may enrich himself 
through the la.bor of slaves Dn his plantation, by speculating in real estate, 
lending 111oney, obtaining gifts frDm the government or graft from the 
people, but he betrays his birthright if he uses his muscles for work. This 
code of honor of the Latin American ruling classes in the early years of 
independence negated their initial advantages, in comparison with North 
America, in accumulated wealth or (using the modern term) the capital at 
their disposal. Without the incentive to work, which is the mainspring of 
ec0'nomic progress, the Latin American nations were bound to fall ·back 
while the former British colonies were advancing. 
The difference in the social fabric of the American nations that emerged 
in the 19th century-a,nd, more specifically, the difference ,in the compositi0'n 
of the upper classes-----determined the contrast in their ,further development, 
even though the constitutions of the South were molded largely after the 
Northern pattern. What counted was not the principles solemnly pro-
claimed in organic laws but the psychology of men. Since human feelings 
were different in the N Drth and the South, histDry took a different course in 
the two areas. 
Economic improvement through work-the gDal of the people in the 
North-demanded peace and the expansion of the United States from the 
Great Lakes to the Gulf of Mexioo, from the Atlantic Coast t0' the P,acific. 
Thus, people have been Dn the move since the early days of independence, 
but the United States fought only one major war in the first century of its 
existence, a war to preserve the unity of the nation. 
The ruling classes of Latin America, on the contrary, had nothing to gain 
:frDm unificatiDn of their continent. They were better off with a dozen or 
more capitals, each with a sovereign head of state, each sovereign surrounded 
by his own court with diplomats and generals, each a source of privileges, 
lucrative appointments and honors" each tied by blood with the best local 
lamilies. Why should the m'asters of the land sacrifice these advantages to 
Bolivar's dreams of unity for Latin America? Thus, the area was divided 
among a dozen independent states, and the struggle for pDwer among local 
rulers resulted in a chain of border dashes. Relations among the sister 
republics degenerated into protracted wars Df each against all. 
During the first century of independence, some Latin American republics 
enjoyed con~iderable periods 0'£ pDlitical stability under the regime of a 
president or dictator strong enough tD crush all opposition. But intervals 
of peace were ·followed by outbursts of violence and revolutions. Bolivia 
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experienced 60 revolutions within a century and had seven presidents in the 
1936-46 decade. Colombia lost 100,000 lives in the famous Thousand Day 
ReV'olution, and another 100,OO~acoording to local estimates--fell as victims 
of political murders and terror in the late '40s and early '50s. The history of 
Venezuela, Peru ,and Argentina is equally stained in blood. 
Such reigns of violence were, of course, detrimental to the development 
of modern economic civilization, but the ruling classes were well off and 
satisfied with the status quo. It took a long time before new social groups 
appeared on the Latin American scene as champions of equaHty, social 
justice and economic progress. The history of Latin America in the 19th 
century-with continuous clashes of brutal force, wars, revolutions, seizures 
of power, elected presidents becoming ruthless dictators and bloody dictators 
transforming themselves into elected presidents-was colorful and dramatic 
but void of internal ,dynamism. It brought little change in the social fabric 
and economic structure ·of the respective nations, and little improvement in 
the standard of living of the masses. In comparison with the changes which 
took place in this period in North America and Northwestern Europe, the 
19th century in Latin America was a time of economic and social stagnation, 
the Dark Age of the Southern Hemisphere. 
Beginning of the New Era: By the tur,n of the century, things began to 
change. New waves of immigrants were reaching the shores of Latin America, 
bringing new blood and new ideas. Foreign capital penetrated the area, 
bringing railroads, electricity, modern utilities. Physicians, architects, edu-
cators and journalists, some of them with French 'training, became more 
conspicuous on the social scene of Latin American cities. Although closely 
connected with the old ruling classes, the intellectuals became -spokesmen 
for the middle classes-businessmen and craftsmen-slowly emerging from 
the aristocratic society. New members joined the old triad of landowner, 
priest and soldier-the intellectual, the businessman, the professional poli-
tician' all risen fro,m a humble environment to mingle with the descendants 
of the landowner families. The old social pyramid began to crack. Surely 
it would be absurd to speak of the Spanish triad as the ruling force in 
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Brazil, Mexico or Chile at the time of W orld War I, though this pattern 
of power prevails even now in some other Latin American republics. 
The transformation, slow and spotty at the beginning, was accelerated 
during and after World War 1. The middle classes became more articulate, 
their influence increased. The weight of the intellectuals and middle classes 
in Latin America today is evidenced by the high standards of local news-
papers. The material they publish-serious political and economic articles, 
literary essays, surveys of local and international art-would find no readers 
in a society that consisted of a self-sufficient nobility and masses of illiterate 
serfs. It is enough to examine the leading newspapers in Argentina, Brazil, 
Uruguay, Chile, Colomlbia and Mexico to realize that ,they address themselves 
to steadily growing social groups and are at the same time their spokesmen. 
The intellectuals in Latin America are essentially carriers of liberal, demo-
cratic ideas. They initiated modern labor legislation after W orId War I, 
in faithful accordance with the suggestions of the International Labor Office. 
What is more important, they tried to improve the educational system and 
modernize public administration in the more advanced republics. But customs 
and attitudes raoted in centuries do not change radically in a couple of 
decades. Thus, Latin America today rem·ains a mixture of ·modern aspirations 
a,nd old prej udices. The m,ost striking manifestation of the clash between 
modern times and the colonial heritage is the state of its educational 
institutions. The magnificent National University of Mexico is second to 
no university eampus in the world. But one has to travel to' Southeast Asia 
or Egypt Ito observe such miserable -rural schools or such a lack .of village 
schools as in some Latin American countries. 
The war for liberation from the colonial heritage is still being fought 
in Latin America. It is heing fought on the ideological and cultuJial levels 
. rather than by force of arms. The progress of the campaign is marked 
by clearing the area O'f dictators, consolidating democratic regimes, modern-
izing ways of life. The drive for industrializatiO'n is one of the many 
aspects of this campaign, a parlt o.f the 'refresh~ng new Latin American na-
tionalism which is not sufficiently understood in the United States. 
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3. Problems of Economic Growth 
THE EXISTENCE of national develO'pment plans is taken fO'r granted in Latin America, but we could find nO' such plans in the countries we 
visited. The failure was due partly to language difficulties. What the local 
economists described as plans or programs are neither in the sense we use 
these terms. They are, rather, enumerations of good intentions by the re-
spective agencies, without any commitments or any indication of the sources 
of the needed funds. 
Each Latin American country has, of course, many prO'j eets in different 
branches of ecO'nomics, public welfare, administration, regional development 
and so fO'rth. Some of them are in the initial phase; others have been de-
veloped with engineering details. Some are ephemeral; others evidence vision 
and great ability on the part of local technicians. But one seldom hears of 
an integrated plan which would coordinate individual projeots and dovetail 
them with available resources. Since neither sound nor fantastic projoots can 
be launched without funds, the shortage of capital appears to local economists 
as the decisive faotor which deprives the people of the good things envisaged 
in pending plans. 
Capital. Clue to Prosperity: The gap between isolated projects and inte-
grated planning may be partly responsible for the widespread notion among 
Latin American intellectuals that their countries are primarily handicapped 
by insufficient private capital formation, the lack of public funds, and the 
reluotance of foreign capitalists and governments to advance them loans and 
credit on the necessary scale and acceptable terms. 
Putting aside the question of foreign cred~ts, I do not believe that a low 
rate of capital formation explains the shortage of funds for produotive in-
vesbnent in Latin Amerioa. Indeed, ·the amount of private and public capital 
available for such investment depends on three main factors: the surplus of 
incomes over current oonsumption; the way in which this surplus is used; 
and the share of the national product available to public authorities for pro-
ductive use. In Latin America, with its striking conJtrast between luxury 
and destitution, the shortage of funds for investment is due largely, I be-
lieve, to the way in which the rich use their incomes. Their standard of living, 
o:£ten extravagant in oomparison with the economic level of · their cO'untry, 
leaves them liule for saving. And, even if they cannot cO'nsume all their 
income, they have no incentive to invest the surplus in enterprises which 
would increase national productive capacity. 
A United States observer is surprised to see the lavishness of the private 
residences an,d public buildings in and around Latin American capitals. In 
Bogota, Colombia, we drove past a group of luxurious buildings encircled 
by lovely gaTdens. We were told this was the Army officers' club built by 
the former dictator Roj as Pinilla. This -splash of splendor far outshone the 
modest ' Army and Navy Building in Washington. In charmingly quiet 
Quito, Ecuador, we saw private mansiO'ns resembling oastles of the Old World, 
surrounded by brick-and-iron fences. In a long row of pretentious private 
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houses, we saw one with a gilded roof. In Lima, Peru, we were invited to a 
plushy club in a palace-like building of a style rarely encountered in the 
United States. In the suburbs of Santiago, Chile, we drove along endless ave-
nues of private residences; they unwittingly proclaimed that huge amounts 
of capital had been diverted from pro,ductive purposes for a display of vanity. 
Latin America is studded with the abandoned foundations of stadiums 
and theaters, hydroelectric dams without powerhouses, irrigation dams with-
out irrigation canals, highways without feeders. Other ambitious develop-
ment plans are collecting dust on shelves in the archives. Some projects 
were dropped because of a change in the administration. A project is usually 
launched under the auspices of a president, minister, governor or influential 
poHtician and becomes associated with his name. But its initiator may dis-
appear from the politioal scene before the projeot is completed, and his 
LUXURY APARTMENTS BUILT IN BUENOS AIRES UNDER JUAN PERON 
successor usually prefers to start something new, bigger and better, bearing 
his own name. The cumulative value of projects started and abandoned 
in this m,anner may be staggering. A waste of capital also results from 
emphasis on ,the colossal and spectacular. A luxurious airport often gets 
priority over the rehabilitation of railroads. Splendid apartment buildings for 
a few are rated higher than slum clearance. 
To these forms of unproductive investment and wasted oapital, we must 
add psychological factofis. For a prospective investor, there is more glamor 
in becoming a landowner or expanding his estate tha,n in run-rung a factory 
or a store. Investment in land speculation is, of course, one .of the worst uses 
of capital from the point of view of -the national economy, but it is encour-
aged by the lack of oonrtinuity in government policy. Nothing short of a social 
revolution would deprive the landowner or land speculator of his wealth, 
while changes in government, whether by constitutional means or by violence, 
may jeopardize all other investments. 
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To sum up, the slow movement of productive investment in Latin America 
depends less Qn a shortage of capital than Qn patterns in its use-in other 
words, more on the at6tude of the people po.ssessing money than on an 
insufficient surplus of current national product over consumption. This is 
an encQuraging conclusion. The propensities and business psychology re-
sponsible for such inefficient uses of capital belong to the heritage of the 
pre-capitalist, colonial era. They are gradually giving way to a new psy-
chology, a new system o.f economic motivations and decisions. This is a long 
. process, a part of a social and economic transfo.rmation of the South that 
began before Wo.rld W,ar I and is no'w in a fairly advanced stage. Its ac-
celeration may be CQnfidently expected. 
Four Obstacles to Progress: As I have tried to show, the rate of economic 
growth and the level o.f economic development vary widely from country 
to country in Latin America. No general statement of the reasons that eco-
nomic progress l,ags in this area is possible because there is no such lag in 
Mexioo, Brazil or Puerto Rico, and the causes of stagnation in Argentina 
are not the same as those of slQW progress in Chile. However, certain fea-
tures characteristic of the Latin American economic scene appear in various 
co.mbinations in several countries that l,ag behind other parts of the con-
tinent, and can be described as roadblocks to. economic pro.gress. 
In CQntrast to. a widespread notion, I do not believe that the rapid growth 
o.f the pO'pulation and its excessive density should be considered an obstacle 
to. economic progress. In different parts of Latin America., there is no appre-
ci.able cQrrelation between the density of po.pulation or its rate of growth 
on O'ne hand, and the level of economic development and pace of economic 
progress on the other. Also, ,there is not much correlation between the 
potential natural resources and the pDOgresS in their utilization. 
Apart from the inefficient use of capital, the following are, in my opinion, 
the most formidable roadblocks on the road of economic progress in certain 
parts of Latin America: 
• Lack of political srtabil~ty, excessive centralization of government, and, 
especially, the dictato.rial regimes. 
• Lack of stability of the national currency and galloping inflation. 
• Lack of educational facilities for the m.asses of the people, par.ticularly 
in ruml areas. 
• A dual eC01Ilomy--1:hat is, the absence of coordination between different 
ecO'nomic sectors, especially between urban and rural sectors. 
Dictators: Dictatorship is a perennial problem in Latin America. Just 
now this form of government is at low ebb, and O'nly three or fo.ur full-
fledged. diotators are o.n the scene, with the danger of a relapse to. dicta,toT-
ship in a few other countries. But the conditio.ns leading to' the concentration 
of power in the hands of an irresponsible individual have not been CQm-
pletely eliminated, and the problem of the impact of dictatorship on economic 
progress deserves serious consideration. 
Latin American diotators appear to be ardent promO'ters of industrialization. 
They subsidize industry, enco.urage foreign trade, initiate the building 01 
highways, invite foreign capilta!. Their era is often marked by the con-
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struction of palaces and public buildings in the capital. But usually they 
leave their country in economic ruin. 
The example of Argentina is enlightening. This was ,the richest country 
in Latin America when Peron wa,s elected president. In 1948, when he had 
grasped dictatorial power, Argentina's national income 'amounted to $5.4 
billion (at 1950 prices). If that country had been permitted to develop as 
other nations of the continent did-not quite .as rapidly as Brazil or Mexico 
but, 'say, rat a flate of 4 per cent a year-it would have reached an income 
of 50me $7.4 billion (at 1950 prices) by 1957. Instead, its 1957 income 
amounted to less than $5 billion, and its cumulative loss in national incQome 
from 1948 ,through 1957 was approximately $10 billion. And to, this hypo-
thetioal loss must be added two items: first, the funds appropriated by the 
dictator . .for him-self, his family and political friends; seoond, the funds he 
wasted or used for self-glorification. 
Diotatorship is expensive. The profession of a diotaJtor is hazardous, and 
he must think of the future. It is tOiO late for him to begin tOo pack his valu-
ables when opposition planes are droning over his palace. A nest egg must 
theref.ore -be set aside and transferred to a safe place in advance. Argentine 
economists estimate that Peron had hundreds of million of dollars in banks 
in the Uni,ted States -and Switzerland when he fled the country. 
The impact of a dictatorial regime on the national economy is strengthened 
by the technique of handling public funds. Straight stealing may be possible 
in small countries hut would be considered had manners in larger ones. In 
the latter, dictators aot in accordance with laws and regulaltions. Competent 
lawyers in Buenos Aires .assured me that i,t was douhtful whether an inde-
pendent court oould convict Peron for his financial transaotions, which oon-
sisted, in the m-ain, of land speculation, juicy government contracts, import 
and export operations---all in ,accord with laws and regulations he himself 
had promulgated. 
A monumental style .of public buildings is characteristic of dictatorial re-
gimes. One is am-azed by v.ast halls, triumphal approaches, colonnaded 
fa~adesand heroic statues within and without the buildings erected by dicta-
tors. Local architects are not to blame for this extravagance. A diotatQor re-
quires that they use huge amounts of cement, ooncrete, stone and other 
materials usually provided by oonoerns controlled by him or his relatives 
and friends. The system of licenses and monopolies in f.oreign trade, another 
favorite policy of dictators, operates similarily. 
But the worst impaot of a diot:atorial regime on economic development is 
that it makes politics the surest and easiest way toward rapid enrichment, 
as in colonial days. Why should one invest money in -a business that requ.ir.~ 
~teady work and promises a return of some 10 per cent a year when there 
are opportunities to opeflate with bo,rrowed money and ~n no time double 
one's capital by shrewd use of licenses and inside information ? Yet, we did 
meet people who had tesi1sted such temptations. In Mendoza, a prosperous 
city in the center of the grape-raising and winemaking region in the interior 
of Argentina, we visited a faotory manufacturing heavy chemicals, that had 
been esta.blished as 'a partnership by a group of local engineers and pro-
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cessed raw materials supplied by small mines situated around Mendoza. The 
manager showed us the plant. It wars built with an investment of $500,000, 
pl'lO'fits were reinvested, and ,at the time of our visit the book value of the 
enterprise was $2.5 million. After a tour of the plant and laboratories, we 
visited the workshop, which resembled a tremendous barn or garage, .'with 
acres of idle benches and lathes. Only a dDzen workers were busy in .this 
shop. "This is where we build machines and equipment for our plant and 
mines," the m'anager explained. 
"How many pieces of each model do you need ? Would it not be more 
economical to' imPDrt your equipment?" I asked. 
He smiled: "What we dO' here would be absurd under no'rmal conditions, 
but it is the only sensible way to' run a plant in O'ur circumstances. We do 
not wish to' ,ask for import licenses. They would cost us more in time and 
money than to build the necessary machines with our own means. Our pDlicy 
has paid." 
In the same city we met with members of the looa1 federation of business-
men. I asked the president: "What does your cO'untry need for economic 
development?" He replied without hesitation: "Freedom and sound govern-
ment." 
"Then you dO' no,t believe that capital is the most urgent need in Argen-
tina?" 
"No, sir. We could raise all the capital we need in Mendoz'a. What we 
need is a climate in which enterprises can thrive withO'u.t fear of arbitrary 
action by the government." 
Under a dictatorial regime an industrialist faces the choice between playing 
ball with the government and making m'oney on m,anipulations with licenses, 
currency, doubtful partnerships and sO' forth, or trying to isolate himself 
from the omnipotent state as the courageous men in · Mendoza did. 
I have mentiDned only the economic impaots of a dictatorial .regime. Its 
impact on education on all levels, from the rural school to the universities, 
and on family life and political morale is ,no less destruotive, but these que -
tions 'are outside the scope of this study. . 
Inflation: Along with political factors~~ currency instability) • and inflation 
are important obstacles to' ,economic progress 'in some parts 'of L~tin America. 
I use "inflation" not in the broad sense in which it is used in sOme United 
Nations p~bliC'ations, where each rise 'of prices is handled ,as inflaJtion, but in 
a narrower sense, as a rapid depreciation of national currency caused by the 
monetary, ' fiscal and credit· polIcies ' of the government. Almost ail Latin 
American cO'untries ' have experienced this type of infl.ation· at some time in 
their histO'ry, though it is not a common 'economic disease in the region today. 
Only a few cO'1.1Thtries-Peru, Bol~via and Chile-are currently suffering from 
galloping deterioration of currency. Their experience deserves particular 
attention beoause what happens there cDuld easily occui'in' 11alf a dDzen other 
Latin American co'untries. ' . ;, 
Chile is a classic example. It is one of the best developed . countries in the 
area-not only economically but also politically, socially 'and culturally. But 
inflation has been Chile's major p'rdblerhslnce the 1880s and' has become' 
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a way of life, a kind of national tradition in the eyes of local economists. 
The U. S. dollar was worth about 8 Chilean pesos in 1929, 31 pesos in 1939 
and 99 pesos in 1949 on the free market. After a bdef 'Spell of r overy in 
1950-51, the Chilean peso resumed its downhill movemept. A aoUar brought 
220 pesos on the :free market in 1953, 315 pesos in 1954, 630 pesos in 1955 
and 777 in May 1958*. 
Chilean economists are aware of the destructive effect of this develop-
ment on the national economy, but some of them are inclined to justify the 
progressive depreciation of the natiO'nal currency, arguing that inflation 
stimulates capital formation and is unavoidable in pedocls of rapid economi 
e~pansion. To my mind, they 'are viotims of an -illusion. 
The rate of recent econO'mic progress in Chile has nO't been very impressive. 
Official statistics estimate the average annual increment of real income frO'm 
1940 to' 1954 at 2.3 per cent per capita of populatiO'n, or 2.1 per cent per 
person engaged in active work. For the decade after World War II, the 
corresponding rates were 1.7 and 1.5 per cent. No comparable statistics are 
available fur the period since 1954, when inflation has been particularly 
violent and very little progress has been recorded in the national 8COIIlomy. 
The average annual gain in real product per worker in the period 1944-57 
was hardly more than 1 per cent if one accepts official statistios at face value. 
Moreover, estimates of real national income under conditions of galloping 
inflation fail to record the deterioration in the quality of products which 
usually accompanies depreciation of currency. 
Nowhere is the disastrous effect of inflation combined w1th government 
control over lorei'gn trade as clear as in Chile. Local businessmen, natives 
and foreigners, told me that 4.5 per cent per month wa1s the normal interest 
on capital in U.S. dollars. Such was the interest on money deposited w1th 
customs authorities by exporters, a oompletely legal and safe operation. If 
one was ready to accept a little risk-with regard to a possible change of 
government, for example-the interest might be 7.5 per cent a month. A 
looal industrialist described his predicament. He had a flourishing business 
and needesl it loan of $100,000 to expand it. Having exhausted his political 
pull, he lapplied for ,a private loan. The prospective credi,tor had a ready 
answer: "I "o,an get monthly interest, of 7.5 per cent with practically no risk. 
How mu~ , more wHI you give -me?" And the industrialist remarked sadly: 
"1£ I pay, him 100 per cent interest, what win be left for me?" 
It is also noteworthy that, under conditions of galloping inflation 'a,nd gov-
ernment control over foreign trade, the success of export-import operations 
does not neCessarily depend on the ' difference between the oost of the' mer-
chandise (including operational expenses) and the sale price. What counts is 
the difference between the actual value of exported and imported goods and 
their evaluation at the custO'ms. 
In brief, the cO'mbination O'f unoontrolled infl.ation with government cO'ntrol 
of foreign trade disorganizes the economic system to' such an extent that its 
• The effort. or the last President of Chlle, Carlos Ibanez, to .top or slow down the galloping inflation were 
fruatrated by the preasure or busineumen and political circles. A stronger anti-inflationary policy is universally 
expected Crom the new Preaidont, Jor,e Mellandri. 
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expansion becomes very difficult, if not impossible. The oontention -that in-
flation accelerates oapital {tormaHon rests on a misunderstanding of historical 
facts. In the situation Germany faced after World War I, runaway -inflation 
served capital formation by expropriating the middle classes and-transferring 
their wealth to ruthless and unscrupulous but dynamic and shrewd operators. 
When there are no Stinneses on the scene and infl·ation is effected for the 
benefit of speculators with the psychology of easy-going- lei'sure cl,asses, it 
slows down oapital formation rather than accelerates it. 
Illiteracy: Lack of universal education and the illiteracy of a large part of 
the population, especially in rur,al areas, also hold back economic progress 
in some parts of Latin America. 
The simplest indicator of the educational level in a country is, perhaps, the 
percentage of illiterate persons in the populatio,n. Because illiteracy is a rare 
phenomenon in modern, economically developed nations, most of them -do 
not record liter,acy in their censuses. But most of the Latin American oountries 
include this query and record everybody who can read a line of large print 
and sign his name as "literate." The percentages of i1literacy in:·Latin 
Amerioan countries, accoTding to this definition, are shown below in Table IV. 
Argentina ·and Chile come cl,osest to universal prim,ary ' education, followed 
by Costa Rica, Cuba, Puerto Rioo and Panama. Brazil has surprisingly high 
illiteracy. Of the countries not listed above, Mexico probably Tanks close to 
the middle of the list, Peru close to the bottom, and Uruguay close to the top. 
But literacy as defined by the censuses d·oog not mean much. Many children 
enroll in the first grade at the age of 7 and leave school at the age of 8 or 9. 
IV. IIliferacy in Lafin America, 1950 
Population aged 10 and over Population agecJ:15~20 
(Percentages) 
Argentina . ....................... . 13.3a 
Chile ........ ........... , ........ . 19.9 
Costa Rica ....................... . 21.2 
Cuba ............................ . 23.6 
Puerto Rico ...................... . 25.6 
Panama .......................... . 28.2 
Paraguay ............. " .......... . 31.8 
Colombia ........................ . 38.6 
Ecuador ...... , ...... .. , .. , " ' ..... . 43.7 
Venezuela ........................ . 51.1 c 
Brazil ............................ . 51.4 
Dominican Republic ............... . 56.9 
EI Salvador ....................... . 57.8 
Honduras ........................ . 66.3 c 
Bolivia ........................... . 68.94 
Guatemala ....................... . 70.3 
Haiti ............................ . 89.3 
a 14 years and over. b 14-29 years. c 7 yeau and over. 45 years and over. 
Source: UN Statistical Yearbook, .1957. 
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In Brazil, for example, less than one-sixth of children enrolled in the first 
grade reach the fourth grade of the elementary school and less than 1 per 
cent gO' as far as the eleventh grade, as cQmpared with 75 per cent in the 
United States. This pyramid of school attendance by age is characteristic of 
the social structure of the natiQn. And conditions are better in Brazil than 
in many other Latin American countries. At least, the Ministry of Education 
in RiO' de Janeiro is fully aware of the crucial importance of the problem of 
elementary education and is trying to attract public attention to it. 
Throughout Latin America, illiteracy is heavily concentrated in ,the villages. 
In countries where more than ' 50 per cent of the population is illiterate, a 
.farmer whO' can read, write 'and count is a rare exception. The lack of 
'elementary education in villages i,s the greatest obstacle 1:0 the development of 
:ihdependerit farms with diversified produotion which could supply the dQmes-
tic market. NO' land reform can create such farms unless a decisive effort is 
made to cover the oQuntryside with an adequate network of primary schoQls. 
In this respect the situation is grim, indeed, in SQnie parts of Latin America. 
Many villages have no school. In others, the Qne small school is reserved for 
the boOys; since c'oeducation is a sin in the eyes of the local priest, girls are not 
admitted. In some villages, schools are housed in miserable adobe huts with-
Qut ' windows, with teachers who appear as destitute as the villagers around 
them. The highest tribute to these teachers is that, with practically nO' school 
equipment, they succeed in giving their barefooted little students at least a 
first glimpse ' of knowledge. We found the exercise books of pupils in good 
shape even in the poorest schQols; their writings and figuring, drawings and 
' sketches of maps were surprisingly good. But it was difficult to realize that the 
'children whom we saw in these pathetic rooms represented the elite of rural 
areas': ' The majority of the children were left outside the school. 
23 
When we spoke of Ithe detrimental effect of m,ass illiteracy on economic 
progress before a group of economists, they were skeptical. A young and very 
ahle economist d"idiculed my argument. "Education has no economic value 
in the villages," he said. "A big hacienda owner told me that the only work 
he demands .of his hands is to cut sugar cane with a machette, and he has 
never noticed that a literate worker does it better than an illiterate one." In 
Brazil, we heard another argument: "When we build a factory," a professor 
of economics said, "we are meating a new source of national income. But 
when we build a new school, we call to life an additional demand for further 
annual outlays." 
We also heard a similar argument in another form: "A poor country Calla 
not do much to improve its agriculture, but it can develop its industry. All 
our efforts must be ooncentl'iated on the urban sector as the most dynamic~ 
flexible and responsive. Later, new ways of life and knowledge will penetrate 
from the cities into the villages, by a process of 'contamination'." We also 
met, of course, people who saw the relationship between education and eco-
nomic progress in the same perspective -as we did. 
I found it difficult to explain to our Latin American friends the impact 
of universal education on economic progress in the United States. A Who's 
Who olf business in the United States sho,ws that only a few of the leaders of 
our big concerns have inherited their position. Most have climbed the ladder 
from the bottom. Efficient operation of a modern economic system is im-
possible in a country if managerial functions are distributed among wealthy 
families and no new blood from the rest of the nation flows to the managerial 
class. This is precisely what i,s happening in some parts of Latin America as 
a result of the lack of adequate education f.or all citizens. It is not impossible 
there to rise from the position of a manual laborer or farmer to the top of 
the social pyr,amid, hut the man who does so is a raTe exception. 
The Dual Economy: The contrasts in the distribution of income and knowl-
edge, combined wilth the traditional domination of the villages by the cities 
and aggravated in some cases by the antiquated system of landlordism, have 
esulted in the perpetuation of -a dual eco,noJmy in Latin Ameriea. A large 
part of the rural population lives its own life, isolated from the monetized 
economy represented by the comparatively prosperous cities. Absence of an 
adequate domestic market prevents the development of mass production and 
threatens to frustrate the effo-rts to expand domestic industry. 
Rehabilitation of poverty-ridden villages is, to some ~tent, a regional 
problem. It appears to be a problem of the south in Mexico, Argentina and 
Chile, of western areas in Colombia and Ecuador, of the great river basins 
and northeastern bulge of Brazil, and so on. In Isome countries, among them 
Peru, Ecuador and Bolivia, the problem of a dual economy merges wi·th the 
problem of racial integration. 
In one form or another, the evils of the dual economy are gaining increas-
ing attention among economists in Mexico and Brazil, but the crucial signifi-
cance of the problem has not been fully recognized. Latin American economic 
policy still emphasizes industry and exports rather than agriculture and the 
domestic market and results in accentuating the cont'rast between compar-
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~ltively pro.spero.US and less developed provinces. In this respect, the economic 
thinking in some parts of Latin America reminds me of a dandy who. has dis-
covered that his toes show through hi-s shoes-and tries to improve his ap-
pearance by buying a new silk hat. . 
4. Trade and Foreign Aid 
THE economic policy of the United States in Latin America-and in more general terms, the fo.reign economic policy of any great nation in any 
area-may be nonveniently examined under two hroad headings: trade and 
aid. The first includes the excha,nge of goods plus the mo.vement of private 
capital (investments) and the exohange nf services (transPO'Jrtation, to.urism, 
and the like). The seoond comprises public grants, development and 
emergency loans, technical assistance and similar measures, either in the 
form O'f unilateral transfers or on the hasis of bilateral nr multilateral co-
operation. For the United States, it also includes this country's contrihutions 
to United Nations assistance programs in Latin Amerioa. 
In hoth areas, the PO'licy of the United States is necessarily determined 
by its national interest. National interest, however, is a sO'mewhat ambiguous 
term. It covers: (1) the direct interest of American businessmen whO' con-
tinually claim protection nn the domestic market and ahrnad, O'ccasionally 
in disregard of the interests of other groups of the population; and (2) the 
long-run interest of the nation as a whole, which may oO'nflict with the im-
mediate interests of certain groups of the population. An inclusive, internally 
consistent fDreign economic policy requires reconciliation of hoth points of 
VIew. 
The development nf such a program fDr the United States in Latin America 
depends on two premises: first, clear understanding of the environment in 
which the program will operate (the level and trends of eoonomic development 
of Latin America, the urgent needs of its people, the patterns of its fo.reign 
trade, the rO'le of foreign capital, the extent and nature of the foreign aid it 
now receives, and sO' on) ; second, a clear definition of the aims and objectives 
of the United States in this area. 
This chapter endeavors to clarify the environment in which our foreign 
economic policy must operate in Latin America; the next chapter will explore 
the ohjectives of our economic policy in this area and outline a program 
which, in my opinion, would conform with hoth U. S. national interests and 
looal conditions. 
Foreign Trade: Because of ,the relatively small size of the Latin Amerioan 
republics ' and the lopsided development of their economy, none of them 
enjoys the same degree of self-sufficiency as the United States or such nations 
as Germany, France and Italy. This fact appears clearly in the ratio of the 
value of foreign trade (th sum of expoTts and imports) to national income. 
In mGst Latin American countries, this ratio fluctuates between 40 and 60 
per cent. In the tiny republics of Central Amerioa and in Cuba, the DO'mini-
an Republic, Venezuela, .  Peru and EcuadO'r, this ratio ranges from 60 to 
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v. Foreign Trade, 7956 
IMPORTS EXPORTS 
Country Millionsof$ % of national income M i /lions of $ % of national income 
Mexico . .. ... . ..... 978 31 688 22 
Guatemala .. ... . .. .. . 138 33 106 25 
EI Salvador .. ...... .. ... .. 105 37 113 39 
Nicaragua ... .... ... .. . .. 69 60 58 46 
Honduras ....... .. . 59 28 73 35 
Costa Rica ...... .... . 91 73 64 51 
Panama .... . .. .. . . ... "83 44 17 9 
Cuba .. .. .. .. .. .. ............ 570 35 666 40 
Dominican Republic . 108 32 125 36 
Haiti .. .............. .. ...... .. 47 14 43 13 
Venezuela .. ...... ........ .. 1,026 30 2,122 70 
Colombia .. . . . . . .. . 657 22 537 18 
Ecuador .... ...... .. .. .... .. .. 81 19 94 22 
Peru .... .. .. .... .... .... ........ 361 40 308 34 
Bolivia ( 1955) ........ 8f' 27 98 32 
Paraguay ..... ,. ... ... .. 95 17 37 24 
Chile ..... . ............... 354 17 546 27 
Argentina ... . .... ..... 1,128 22 944 19 
Brazil . .......... . ...... .. 1,234 10 1,482 12 
Uruguay .... .. . .. .. .. .... 206 29 211 30 
Sources : UN Statistical Yearbook, 1957 and Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, 1956, Vol. I. 
80 per cent; it is comparatively low, under 30 per cent, in Haiti and Brlazil. 
Comparable figures are ,appro.ximately 10 per cent for the United States, 
20-30 per cent for West Germany, France and Italy. 
Thus, foreign trade is much more important to Latin American nations 
than to' the United States. Indeed, the area as a who.le relies O'n imports not 
only for capital goods and articles consumed by wealthy peO'ple in the cities, 
but also. fo.r textiles, SDme staple foods, petroleum products, cO'al, met'als and 
chemicals. It c9ver~ these imports with exports o.f coffee, cocoa, bananas 
and sugar; meat," wool and other animal products; crude petroleum, CDpper, 
"lead, zinc and tin ores, wolframite and saltpeter; cotton and sisal. Export 
industries, especially the activities 0'£ large 'plantations and mining, dominate 
the Latin American economy. The uneven distribution of natural resources 
within the continent has determined the composition and, to' some extent, the 
direction of the fDreign trade 0.£ individual countries. In "many cases a single 
i!tem predominates in the country's export. In contrast, the list of imported 
goods is much longer and varies little from country to country. 
Almost all Latin American countries report a higher value O'f exports than 
of impo.rts: that is, an active balance in merchandise trade. This may be. 
due to' the fact that they have to. pay for transporting their products in foreign 
bottoms. Some Latin American economists complain that their countries are 
compelled to pay high prices for imported goods and are underpaid when 
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Exports as Percent of Total Exports • 
Ha iti ........ .. . _iI§~~I~i~illlill~21i22~llilliilillilN1 
Brazil ..... .... _±£ill~~~~1i21i21i2ii20J2±21 
Cuba .... ... ... b· if@[~~]iifEillill11ill~~~lIITfEi12§jill] _ 2]82 
Chile . ······· ·· ... : iiiiiiiio..........: .................... ~ 
Bolivia . .... ... :;;;,;,;,;.;,;,;_ .... 
Honduras .. 
*1957 
they market their products. The facts, however, do. nO't substantiate this com-
plaint. As a rule, Latin America pays world prices fO'r foreign products 
and obtains world prices for exported goods. The exorbitant prices which 
local consumers pay for imported articles in retail markets result largely 
frO'm high import duties, the high rates of interest prevailing in Latin America, 
and similar factors. 
There is no doubt, however, that Latin American countries are affected 
unfavO'rably by excessive fluctuatiDns in the prices of their basic products. 
Changes in the prices Df oDffee, tin or copper that oause only a ripple in the 
United States may exercise a deep impaot on the economy .of a small nation 
which depends heavily on expDrt of one O'f these products. 
The Geographical Pattern: Latin America's resentment of its precarious 
pDsitiDn on the wDrld market is directed primarily against the United States. 
There is no evidence, of course, that Yankee merchants charge higher prices 
for their goods or offer .less fDr Latin A.merican pr<>ducts than dO'merchants 
of other natiDns, but for Latin America the United States is the main outlet 
for local products and the main source Df supply fDr machinery, autO'mO'biles, 
household appliances and other imported articles. In 1956 the United States 
accounted for 46 per cent of the value of all exports from Latin America and 
for 50.3 per cent .of all impO'rts intO' that area. Its share in the export of 
merchandise from Latin American countries varies widely-from 11.6 per 
cent in Uruguay to 94.8 per cent in Banama-while its quota in imports 
ranges from 13.4 per cent in landlocked Paraguay to' 78.2 per cent in Mexico, 
our closest neighbO'r in the South. 
The variation in our share in exports of individual Latin American coun-
tries depends mainly on what they can offer. We take the largest part of their 
export of sugar, ooffee, bananas, crude petroleum and metal ores, but have 
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little use for their cottOon, meat and woool. In imports, on the other hand, the 
United States faces many competitors in the Latin American market: Great 
Britain, West Germany, Japan land, for some articles, France, Switzerland, 
Italy and the Scandinavian countries. Our m'ain advantage is that our ports 
are closer to Latin America-a faot that has less weight in Argentina, Uru·guay 
and Brazil than in Central America, the Caribbean and on the Pacific COoast 
of South America. Excluding Argentina and Uruguay, which have stronger 
ties with Europe than with nations in this hemisphere, the United States ac-
counts for 72.,5 per cent of all export'S and 51.5 per cent of all imports Oof Latin 
America. (See Table VI, opposite page.) 
Latin America accounts for 20-25 per cent Oof U. S. exports and nearly one 
third of its imports. Its share in our exports has been steadily increasing 
since the turn of the century; its share in our imports skyrocketed during 
W orId War II and has declined slightly in recent years: 
Average 
1891-1900 
1901-1910 
1911-1920 
1921 -1 930 
1931-1940 
1941-1950 
1951-1955 
r--Share 01 Latin America in U.S.~ 
Exports Imports 
9.5 27.4 
12.0 25.4 
13.0 31.2 
15.3 26.0 
17.0 24.1 
18.3 37.6 
22.4 33.2 
The exchange of goods between Latin American republics represents only 
a small fraction of their foreign trade. It accOounted for the following per-
centages of exports. from Latin American countries and of world exports to 
these countries: 
1953 
From latin America . .. . . . . . . .... .. . 9.5 
To latin America . . . . .... . .. .. . . . . 12.0 
1954 
9.1 
10.5 
1955 
9.5 
11.0 
1956 
7.8 
9.0 
Latin America is not an economic unit which meets its needs mainly through 
its own production and the interchange of products within its borders, as 
does Europe or North America. Trade among the Latin American countries 
is made difficult by geographical conditions, lack of adequate transportatiop 
and also partly by historical factors. The area has not freed itself completely 
frDm the heritage of the colonial era, which left an economy oriented tDward 
exports rather than satisfaction of domestic needs. At the time of our visit 
to Latin Ameriea, local newspapers and economists showed a considerable 
interest in the idea of a Latin American common market which would 
strengthen the economic unity of the area by stimulating trade between the 
sister-republic'S. Such a development would be desirable for many reasons, 
but it would require a drastic reorientation of the domestic eCDnomic policies 
of Latin American governments. Their present industrialization policies, 
which often encourage , the same industries in all parts of the continent, are 
not f.avOor~ble ~o its:, economic" ,unification on the basi of division of labor. 
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VI. U.S. Share In Trade, 1956 
------ u.s. % 0110101 -------.. 
Country Exports 
Panama .. . . ........ . . . .. . .. . . . .... .. . . ... 94.S 
Guatemala .. . . . . ... . . .. . .. .. .. . .. . . . . .... 74.1 
Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 72.9 
Colombia .. .. . . . . . ..... .. .. . . .. . ... . . . .. . 71 .4 
Cuba . .. . . . . .. . .. . .. . . . . .. . . .. .. . . .. . .. .. 64.7 
Honduras .. .. .... . . . .. . . .. . . . . . .. . .. . . .. . 64. 1 
Ecuador ... . .... . . . . ..... . ... . .. .... . .. . . 59.5 
Bolivia . . . . . . . . .. ..... . .. . . .. .. ..... .. . . .. 55.4 
Brazil . . ... . .. ... .. . . ... .. . . ... . . . ... . .. .. 49.6 
Costa Rica .. . . ..... . . . .. . . .. . ..... . . .. .. . 48.1 
Dominican Republic . .. .. ... . .. .. .. . . . .. . . . 46.8 
EI Salvador . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44.6 
Chile . . . . .. . ... . . .. .. . . . . . . . ..... ...... .. 42.4 
Venezuela .. . . . .. . . . . . .. . .. ... . . . .. ...... . 39.5 
Peru ... . .... ... ..... . ..... . . . . . . .... ... . . 36.8 
Haiti . . . . ..... . . . .. . .. . . .. . . .. .... . ... . . . 34.1 
Paraguay . . .. . ....... .. . . ... . . . .. . . ...... IS. I 
Argentina . . . . ... . . . . .. . . .... . . .. . . ...... . 12.5 
Uruguay . . .. . . . .. . . . . . .. . . ... .... . . ...... 11.6 
Source: UN Yearbook of International Trade Sta tistics , 1956, Vol. I. 
Imports 
60.0 
64.1 
78.2 
61.6 
76.2 
73.8 
52.0 
57.9 
28.8 
51.7 
65.9 
52.6 
42.9 
59.1 
49.5 
62.1 
13.4 
IS.O 
15.9 
There are indications that Latin American countries are moving toward 
a greater diversification of 'their agriculture and industry, designed to sub-
stitute domestic products for imported goods to some extent. This tendency 
will change both the composition and direction of the foreign trade 0.£ the 
continent. It will hardly stimulate trade among Latin American countries 
but may contribute to an expansion of their trade with Europe and Asia 
while reducing, at the same time, their dependence on the United States. In 
the long run, such a tendency would be in the interest of both the United 
States and Latin America. The latter would strengthen its position on the 
world market while the United States would be freed of the oharge of monopo-
listic or semi-monopolistic domination of Latin American markets. 
The share of the USSR in the Latin A.merican foreign trade is not impres-
sive: In 1955, exports of Latin American countries to the USSR, the East 
European satellites and China totaled $115 million, a little less than 1.4 per 
cent of their total exports. Imports ·from Communist-dominated countries 
into Latin America were of similar magnitude. The Soviets have m·ade some 
inroads in Latin American markets recently, but the Iron Curtain countries 
account for hardly more than 3 per cent of the foreign commerce of the 
area. 
Summing up, Latin Amerioa is a very important partner in the intra-
regional trade of the Western Hemisphere, but Latin American nations d 
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not trade much among themselves; Argentina and . Uruguay are the only 
countries in the area where foreign trade is Ooriented toward Western Europe; 
Paraguay is the only country trading primarily with its im·mediate neighbors; 
commerce with the United States predominates in the foreign trade of all 
other Latin American countries. 
Because of this geographic pattern, Latin Amerioa does not feel itself a 
part of the world market, subject to' that market's ehb and flow. I,t feels, 
rather, an economic dependence on the Colossus to' the North, which arbitrarily 
fixes the pr,ices and volume of its exports and imports. Such a picture is false, 
because the Colossus itself depends on trends in the world economy. It is, 
nevertheless, extremely difficult to' explain the true situation to local economists 
and impossible to explain it to the man in the street. 
Foreign Capital: The problem of capital is the maj or issue in discussions 
of ways to accelerate economic progress in Latin America. I have tried to 
show that the scarcity of capital is not the maj Oor obstacle to' prosperity in 
Latin America; the main roadblocks are psychO'logical and political, one of 
them being unproductive use and waste of availarble funds. But whatever 
the causes, the area needs a continuous inflow· of funds from abroad, and a 
program of foreign economic: policy in Latin America must meet this need. 
The economic development of Latin America in colonial times rested on 
the combination of local slave lahor and Spanish capital (imported from the 
mother country or amassed by plundering the conquered land) . Foreign 
investments of the modern type appeared on the Latin American scene after 
the wars for independence, in the 1820s. British investme.nts in Argentina 
were followed by loans to almost all Latin American republics, floated in 
London and later in Paris. European capital was lured by the myth of the 
fabulous wealth of the young overseas nations. Very soon, however, all Latin 
American loans fell into default, and the flow of European capital to South 
America and the Caribbean ceased for three deoades. It was resumed in 
the 1860s and gained strength after steamers a.ppeared on trans-Atlantic lanes. 
High profits from tin, copper and silver mines and sugar and coffee planta-
tions "in Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Peru and the Caribbean attr.acted invest-
ment capital. Considerable capital also went fOor railroad construction and 
loans to local governments. Great Britain was the main creditor, followed by 
France, Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands. Before the turn of the cen-
tury, United States capital likewise appeared in Mexico, Cuba and, on a 
smaller scale, in .other Latin American republics. * 
By 1914, foreign investments in Latin America totaled $8.5 billion, with 
Great Britain leading ($3.7 billion), the United States in second place ($1.7 
billion), France third ($1.2 billion), and Germany fourth ($900 million). 
This was the high tide of European investment in that part of the world. If 
O'ne considers changes in the purchasing power Oof the dollar, it was also the 
high mark of all foreign investments, including those of the United States, in 
the expanse from the Rio Grande to the Straits of Magellan. In relation to this 
area's aggregate national income or the value of its exports, foreign capital 
.United Nations. Foreign Capital in Latin America (New York, 1955). 
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World Bank Loans 
to Latin America 
Country 
No.ol Amount 
loans (in mill.) 
Brazil 
. . ...... " $182.4 
Chile .. . .. . .. 7 73.6 
Colombia 
... . " 111.2 
Costa Rica ., . I 3.0 
Ecuador ......... 5 32.6 
EI Salvador .. 2 23.6 
Guatemala . .. I 18.2 
Haiti .. . " ... .... " 2.6 
Honduras 
""" " 
I 4.2 
Mexico .. .... .... .. 7 152.3 
Nicaragua . , . 10 22.9 
Panama ........ .. 3 6.8 
Paraguay 
" "" " 
4.4 
Peru .. .. .. .. " ..... 8 40.9 
Uruguay ... . . 3 64.0 
Total 
15 countries 72 loans $744.7 
in Latin America today represents Dnly a fraction of what it was on the eve 
of World War I. 
The inflow of capital frDm Europe was interrupted by World War I and 
resumed on a oonsiderably reduced scale in the interwar years, while previous 
investments depreciated 'and were pa'rtially withdrawn. The movement 'Of 
capital across the Atlantic was stopped again in the 1930s hy the great de-
pression, which was followed hy World War II, bringing fuITher deprecia-
tion and withdrawal Df British, French, German ·and other foreign holdings. 
Before the outbreak of World War II, foreign investments in Latin America 
were estimated at $9 hillion, including $3.5 hill ion held by the United States, 
$4.0 Ibillion held by the United Kingdom, and $1.5 .billion provided by Dther 
European countries. In terms of dollars with the purchasing power of 1914, 
the total Df foreign investments was equivalent to' $6.3 billion-those of the 
United States, $2.8 billion, and those Df Europe, $3.5 billion. Thus, the 
withdrawal oJ European capital from Latin America was only partly offset by 
the inflow of investments from the United States (or the purchase of European 
interests by United States concerns). 
During World War II and in the postwar years, United States capital 
gained a new positiDn in Latin America, mainly in the fo·rm of direct produc-
tive investment, ,but again its advance could not offset the retreat of European 
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apital. * This general trend has continued. The holdings of the United Stat s 
in Latin America grew steadily, from $3 billion in 1946 to $7 billion in 1956 
When the change in the purchasing power of the dollar is taken into account, 
the latter amount is equivalent to $4.8 billion at 1946 prices. This represents 
a gain of 60 per cent in a decade, or an average growth rate of less than 4 
per cent a year-a far cry fr0'm the spectacular expansion P0'rtrayed by the 
U. S. Department of Commerce in its 1957 report on U. S. investment in 
Latin Amer,ica. There has also been a steady but not very brisk inflow 
f capital fr0'm Europe. 
The total am(Hl,nt of all foreign investments in Latin America in 1956 has 
been estimated by our ICA -at $9.5 billion-equivalent t0' $5.7 billion at 
1944-45 prices and hardly more than $3 hillion at 1914 prices. 
The Role of U.S. Private Capital: Until 1929, U. S. capital favored sugar 
plantations in Cuba and oil wells in Mexic0'. More recently , Venezuela and 
Brazil have advanced to first place. The b00'k value O'f U. S. investments in 
Latin American countries in 1956 was as follows (in millions of dollars ) : 
Tofal .. .... . ...... . . ... .... .. 7,008 Central America·, Dominican 
Venezuela .................. .. 1,817 Republic, Haiti .... .... ... . . . 
Brazil .. ................ . . . ... 1,209 Argentina .... ...... . . . . ..... . 
Cuba . .. .. ... ... ............. 774 Peru . . ... . .. . . .. . ..... . . . . .. . 
Chile . .............. .. ....... 677 Colombia .... . . . .. . . . ....... . 
Mexico .. . , . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . ... 675 Others ......... . .. . . . .. . .. .. . 
* Investment. in Panama exclude tanker and shipping operations ($460 million in 1956). 
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce. US. Inves'men', in 'he Latin American Economy. 1957. 
610 
470 
354 
289 
133 
Petroleum is the main field f0'r U. S. capital ($2.0 billion in 1956) ; manu-
factures come next ($1.5 billion), followed by mining ($1.1 billion), planta-
tions ($632 million) and trade ($495 million). 
The sales of U. S. corporations in Latin America grossed $4.9 billiori in 
1955. Products worth $2.1 billion were exported, mainly to t4e United States, 
and $2.8 billion was received on the domestic markets. The U. S. Department 
of Commerce emphasizes that American capital accounted for 30 per cent of 
the exports of Latin American nations in 1955. It 'is an open question, how-
ever, whether this speaks well for our investments in the area. Production 
for ex:port is a typical operation of foreign capital in colonies _ ap9 has never 
been popular with the indigenous populations. . 
U. S. corporations in Latin America had. 625,000 employes in 1955 and, 
as a rule, offered them better working conditions and higher wages, than 
native employers. Remitted corporate profits in that year amounted to 
$680 milHo,n; the net return on equity capital was no less than 14' per ·cent. 
In addition, the b0'0'k value of the enterpri~es increased ·by one billion pollars 
in 1955, although only $148 million ~f new United States money went i~to 
produotion. The large part of increased value, therefore, represented capital 
gains of United States stockholders, bringing their t0'tal gains up to 30 per 
• What happened in Latin America after the outbreak pC ' World War II conCormed with a much 
broader, worldwide trend. The value of foreign investments in the world as a whole was estimated at 
$42 billion in 1944-45. aI compared with $44 billion in 1914. M~reover. the $42 billion in 1944-45 was roughly 
equivalent to S25 bUlion at 1914 prieee. 10 relation to world income, the value of Coreigo investment. in 
1941.45 was less than a third, and probably not much more than a fourth . of that in 1914. 
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cent or more of equity capital. Latin American econO'mists are fairly well 
informed on the affairs of foreign concerns in their cOountries, but the public 
at large knows little about this subject and believes that the rate O'f prO'fits of 
the U. S. corporations is even higher. 
Foreign capital, especially U. S. capital, is ubiquitous in Latin America, hut 
its contributiOon to the economic growth of the area is somewhat reduced by 
fluctuatiOons in its flow, which are determined by the opportunities offered 
for investment elsewhere and largely by the far-fledged, often glO'bal, plans 
O'f leading corporations. The decisions of the latter, although wholly logical 
from the point of view of ,their stockholders, may appear erratic from the 
point of view of host countries. The U. S. Department of COommerce estImates 
the flow of net direct investments of U. S. corporations into Latin A,merica as 
follOoWS (in milliO'ns of dollars) : 
1946 
1947 
1948 
1949 .. 
1950 
1951 .. 
71 
457 
332 
332 
40 
166 
1952 
1953 
1954 
19~5 
1956 
227 
117 
88 
193 
612 
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Balance 0/ Payment •• S,ati,tical Supplement. Wa8h~ton 1958. 
The average inflow of about $200 million a year in 1950-56 is a fairly 
meaningless figure when the amounts for single years vary from $40 million 
to $612 million. Moreover, 'an investment Oof half a billion dollars in the oil 
fields of Venezuela can hardly be considered by people in Brazil, Mexico or 
Chile as an investment in the expanding economy of the continent. 
The attitude of people in Latin America to the predominance of U. S. 
capital in certain economic sectors (mining, steel, plantatiO'ns) is neither 
hostile nOor enthusiastic . . We heard no complaints that U. S. firms underpay 
their workers, violate labor regulations, evade taxes or compete unfairly with 
local capital. But likewise we did not hear any local economist, businessman, 
journalist or government official refer to U. S: capital in the country in the 
eulO'gistic terms used by our Department of Commerce. All in all, people 
seem to realize that the inflow of foreign capital i~.in the interest of their 
cOountry. We Oobserved this attitude in Brazil and Mexico, Chile and ColOombia, 
and to' some extent in other countries we visited, in . prOoyincial cities as we~l 
as in capitals. 
SOometimes people seemed proud that American, British, French~ GenTIan, 
Japanese and Dutch corporations were building fa<;tories around their city, 
hut Dn the whole they were nDt happy a,bO'ut the way in which foreign capital 
is used in their countries. Resentment is w~despr.ead against the extliaction 
of Dil ·and Dres by foreign enterprises. PeO'ple think that such operations are 
depriving Latin American nations of their resources. In Argentina, Brazil 
and MexicO' this idea has found its expression in almost hysterioal oppositiO'n 
to' exploitation of petroleum by fO'reign capital. The slqg~ , "Th~ , Oil. Is 
Ours" has become a part of the credO' O'f ecO'npmic nationalislIl:. :Likewise 
there is resentment, though less' passionate, against exporting local raw mate· 
rials such as nres, instead of processing them at the mouth of the mines. We 
heard m1any complaints that foreign capital is guided not by the interest of 
the host countries but by the search fo.r profit&--which is, of course, equally 
true of dnmestic capital. Similarly, people complain about the tremendous 
p~ofits foreign capital receives, without noticing that domestiC' capital is 
even more rapacious, demanding annual interest of not less than 30 per cent, 
and ,in some cases as much as 90 per cent. 
All in all, people would prefer foreign po·rtfQtlio investments in local private 
and puhlic enterprises tn the direct investments which have become the pre-
vailing operation of private foreign capital in Latin A.merica. 
The Eximbank and the u.s. Government: Along with the inflo.w of private 
foreign capital, Latin America obtains some funds for its economic develop-
ment from the World Bank and Export-Import Bank of Washington (Exim-
bank). The purposes and statutes of these two organizations differ but they 
often act cnncurrently, and m-any projects have been financed hy bnth organi-
zations. Indeed, when a foreign government uses a loan from the World Bank 
fnr purchasing machinery or industrial equipment in the United States, this 
loan operates like an Eximbank credit. Inversely, when an Eximhank loan 
permits the government or its contractors tn buy railroad equipment, road 
building machinery, trucks or electrical-installation materials in the United 
States, the .operation differs little from financial support of the respective 
projects by the World Bank. 
Both institutions charge the sa,me interest f0'r their lo-ans, usually 4.5 to 5.5 
per cent, and reserve the right of control over the use of funds lent by thenl. 
But the Eximbank opens short-term as well as long-term credits and occasion-
ally lends rather small amounts 0'f money, while the World Bank concentrates 
on long-term loans for larger projects. 
The Eximbank began operations in February 1934 and authorized credits 
totaling almost $9 billion up to the end of 1957. Of this amount, $3.2 billion 
was designed for financing expo.rts to Latin America, but credit'S f0'r $669 
minion were cancelled, so that $2.5 billion remained available. Only $1.8 
billion was actually disbursed, and ·almost half of this amount has been re-
paid. Currently, the Eximhank authorizes new credits to Latin America at 
a rate of roughly $200 million a year, but a part of -authorized credits is usually 
cancelled, and new credits .are partly offset :by repayment of old debts. Thus, 
the net new credits of the Eximbank to the Latin American ooonomy hardly 
exceed $100 million a year. 
Direct grants and loans by the United States Government are another 
source of capital inflow to the area. Apart from military aid, which adds 
little to the economy of the receiving nation, the U. S. Government awarded 
the Latin American republics $225 million in loans and $165 million in grants 
in the three years 1954-56. From the point of view of Latin America, these 
loans and gran'ts are more productive tthan the inflow of private capital not 
QllIly because they are direoted to' proper targets but 'also because the country 
does not pay the high price demalllded by private capital. 
'. The World Bank: Most satisf.actory to' the Latin American countries, how-
ever, are the loans accorded by the World Bank. They are usually directed 
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toward the most urgent projects, are given on terms as favorahle as those of 
the Eximbank, and in1p1y no politic-al obligation on the part of the receiving 
oountry to the creditor· nation. Up to the end of 1957, the World Bank had 
awarded 72 loans to· 15 Latin American countries for a total amount of $74.5 
million, distributed as follows (in millions of dollars) : 
Brazil .............. 182 Uruguay. . . . . . . . . . . 64 Nicaragua. . . . . . . . . 23 
Mexico............ 152 Peru ........ . .. , .. 41 Guatemala. .. ..... . 18 
Colombia ..... .. ... III Ecuador. . . . . . . . . . . 33 Panama. . . . . . . . . . . . 7 
Chile .... . . . . . . . . . . 74 EI Salvador ... . .... 24 Others. .. ......... 16 
Source: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Loans at Work, March 1958. 
All these are development loans. Almost half the total a-mount was 
designated for generation ,and distribution of electric power, some 40 per 
cent for building and rehabilitating railroads and highways, the rest for 
agrioulture (farm mechanization, irrigation and flood oontrol, and so on), 
industry (pulp) and communications (telegr-aph and telephone). Of $50 
million lent by the World Bank to Latin America in 1957, more than 80 per 
cent went for the development of power ($15 million to Chile, $1.6 million to 
Nicaragua, $25.5 million to Uruguay). 
Current Supply of Foreign Capital: In all, in 1954-56 Latin America 
obtained almost $2 billion in loans, credits and grants from abroad: some 
$900 million in direct private investments from the United States, approxi-
mately $200-250 million from other countries, a.bout $400 million in loans 
and .grants from the United States Government, $300 million from the Exim-
bank and $150 million from the World Bank. The total is higher than in the 
preceding three years because of unusually large private investments in 1956. 
The normal flow of foreign capital is probably close to $600 million a year, 
with one third supplied by private capital and two-thirds provided by the 
World Bank and United States Government, either directly or through the 
Eximbank .. * 
Taking into account the current national income of the area-approximately 
$40 billion-and growth of population at a rate of 2.5 per cent a year, L'atin 
America needs net investments at an annual rate o,f $3 to $4 billion for 
adequate development of its economy (including the building of houses but 
excluding the maintenance cost of existing capital). The flow from abroad 
described above meets S0me 15 to 20 per cent of this need. Economic 
progress in the area could proba,bly be accelerated if, along with changes 
in the psychological climate, economic practices and other conditions, the 
inflow of capital were to increase. It is ohvious, however, that from the 
point of view of the economies .of the Latin American countries, an expan-
sion. of loans from the World Bank would mean more than a much larger 
increment in foreign private investments. 
The preceding discussion has not dealt with the operations of the new 
U. S. Development Loan Fund and the Special Fund for Latin America, both 
established in 1957. The Development Loan Fund ($300 million for the 
first year) is in an early phase of operation and has not attracted much 
• Since the U~ted States contributes more than one-third of the capital of the World Bank, its share in 
public 'funds ' flowing into the Latin American economy frOID abroad is dOle to 90 per cent. 
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attention in Latin America. Of the original applicatiOons for loans totaling 
$4 billion, only 3 per cent (44 million) was requested by Latin American 
governments. The comments on the objectives and philosophy of the Fund, 
as presented in the Report to Congress on Mutual Security, leave an impres-
sion that the program is more cOoncerned with the cold war and promotion 
of principles of free enterPrise than with the economic development of the 
respective countries: 
The Special Fund, of $15 million appropriated in the fiscal year 1957 was 
used essenti,aHy for small loans to small oountries: $3 million to Honduras, $2 
million tOo Panama, $2 million to Costa Rica, $2 million to Ecuador, $2 milliOon 
to Peru, $1 million to Par,aguay, and the rest tOo the Organi~a.tion of the 
American States. The amounts allocated and the pattern of distributiOon sug-
gest that the purpose was to give sOomething tOo as large as possible a numlber of 
aEplicant states, 'without serious thought of helping Latin America in develop-
ing its resources. 
U. S. Technical Assistance: The effOorts of Latin American countries to ac-
celef1ate economic progress and improve the living oonditiOons of the people 
are support~d by numerous technical ass~st~nce programs of the United N a-
tiOons, ' the United States and private org·anizations. The oldest and most impOor-
tant among them is the program inaugurated in the 1930s 'by the Institute for 
Inter-American Affairs (IIAA). The ideas of this pro~ram were later applied 
on a much broader scale in the Point Four progf1am. Suhsequently the latter 
changed its name in . line with the vicissitudes of U. S. politics-it was called 
Toohnioal COooperation Administration (TCA) in. 1950-53, then became a 
part of Foreign Operations (FOA) and was integrated with International 
C<?operati~n (leA) in 1955. The administrative ohanges, however, have not 
seriOously affected the operations of the program.in Latin Amerioa where even 
now it 'is known under its original names, IIAA or Point FOour. Detailed dis-
cussion of it is not within the scope of this study. The following paragraphs 
mention only the salient features. * 
, The prpgram mainly covers the four fields of health, education, agriculture 
?nd industry, but attentiQn is al~o given to transportation, the productivity 
prohle~ (la;bOor) " organization" of modern public administration, and so on. 
Eaoh project is carned out on the hasis ' of co()pe:r:ation between the United 
States mission and the. hos~ government and must be initiated by the latter. 
In each project the U o. S.- agency supplies specially trained technicians and 
funds oo;vering their salaries an~ purohase of necessary equip~ent. The host 
government defrays all other expenses that demand looal curren.cy, including 
salarles of looal personnel. In time, native workers who have received on-the-
job tr'aining replace' the United Staets technicians, and the share of, the United 
States in financing the pr,oj eel declines while that of the host government 
increases until the U. i _.S. mission withdraws completely and the project is 
continued by local personnel alone. . 
B~se of the transfer of funds and considerable discrepancies between 
i ~ ._ 
---
• An excellent analyai. ,of t~a and other technical allistance program. in Latin America will be found 
in the report pubii.hed br t~ National, Plannin, A.88ociatioD UDder the title "Technical Cooperation in 
Latin America. Reeommendali~n. r';r the 'Fulure." ' .. 
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VII. U. S. Technical Assistance and Economic Aid 
(In thousands 0/ dollars) 
TECHNICAL COOPERATION OTHER ECONOMIC AID 
Cumulative Cumulative 
through through 
Country 1956 1957 1958 1958 1956 1957 1958 1958 
- --
Mexico , , , , ' , , , , , . , 705 888 680 5,841 
Guatemala ........ 1,983 2,238 2,400 8,974 16,'93 '5,280 '0,000 46,281 
EI Salvad·or ",' , ", 934 ',069 ',000 5,400 
Nicaragua . . . . .. .. . 756 68' 900 4,820 
Honduras ... . ... . . ','56 1,324 ',350 7,266 
Costa Rica . .. .. . . . 907 904 1,050 6,483 
Panama .. .. . . ..... 1,096 1,023 1,'70 7,710 
Cuba ........... . . 471 569 570 2,564 
Dominican Republic 265 156 190 1,634 
Haiti ..... , .. , , " , , 1,361 ',"6 ',300 5,795 5,000 ',010 7,658 
Venezuela . . . . ... .. 150 J35 '70 999 -
Colombia , ." ,,'" , 1,323 ','56 ',290 7,872 
Ecuador " " ' , ', '" 1,660 1,809 ',880 10,215 
Peru .... .. .. .. .. .. 2,819 2,594 2,850 16,419 
Bolivia . . .. .. . ..... 2,500 3,300 3,100 17,000 22J 900 20,000 17,000 74,100 
Paraguay "" , "' " 1,801 1,530 1,480 10,656 
Chile .. .. . . ....... 2,174 2,456 2,500 12,656 
Argentina .. . . . . ... 350 350 84 84 
Uruguay ... . .. .... 154 254 200 1,650 
Brazil ..... . ....... 3,604 4,512 4,700 23,134 
TOTAL . ......... 25,819 27,714 29,130 157,438 44,177 36,290 27,000 128,123 
Source: Computed from the Report of the ICA for the Hearings before the Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, House of Representatives, 85th Congress. Mutual Security Act of 1958, Part XIV. 
appropriations and actual use of funds, it is difficult to obtain a perf~tly clear 
pioture of the program and its distribution among individuai countries and 
fields of activities. According to the survey presented by the Administration 
to the House Foreign Affairs Co~mittee, the United States has spent a t,obl 
of $157 million on technical assistance in 'Latin America, from the' start of 
the respective programs through the fisoal year 1958. Expenditures have ~­
creased gradually in recent years: ,$25.8 million in fi,soal year 1956, $27.7 
million in 1957, $29.1 million in 1958 (estimated ) . Brazil has the largest 
pr~gram, followed by Bo~ivia, Peru, Paraguay and ·Guatemala. 
Economic aid~partly as defense support, partly as ~mergency grant~ 
was extended to Bolivia, Guat~ala and Haiti, in response to the critical 
situation in these countries as a result of political uphea~als: . 
All in all $285 million had been spent in iatin American countries fo~ tech-
nical assistance and. economic aid in the past seven years- less than the cost 
01 a modern battleship or ~ircraft carrier. ' 
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VII'. U. S. Technical Assistance by Main Activities 
Fiscal Y ear 1958 ( Estimate, in thousU!nds 0/ dollars) 
Health, Inaus- Trans-
sanita- Eauca- Agricul- try, por-
Country Total tion tion ture mining tation Labor Other* 
Mexico .. .. .... .... .. .. .. .. .... .. .... 680 64 15 373 16 110 102 
Guatemala** .... ........ ...... 12,400 996 780 5,042 80 5,020 20 462 
EI Salvador .... .. .. .. .. ........ .. 1,000 206 119 374 70 84 147 
Nicaragua .... .. .. .. ...... .. .... .. 900 94 270 388 28 50 10 60 
Honduras . ... .. . . ... . . 1,350 212 408 442 18 110 50 110 
Costa Rica .... .. .. .. .... .. ...... 1,050 218 100 416 95 36 22 163 
Panama .......... .... .... .. ........ 1,170 175 299 478 78 23 II 106 
Cuba .......... .... ........ .... .... .. 570 94 245 27 92 26 86 
Dominican Republic .. 190 183 7 
Haiti·· ..... . .. . .. . . .. 3,300 790 310 1,300 25 720 155 
Venezuela .. .. ............ .. .... .. 170 170 
Colombia . .. . . . . . ... . . 1,290 381 III 565 80 153 
Ecuador .... .. .. .... .... ...... ...... 1,880 446 327 725 116 266 
Peru ........ .. .......... .. ............ 2,850 538 406 1,054 146 706 
Bolivia ........ .. .... .... .. .. .... .. .. 4,200 526 525 1,552 87 940 76 494 
Paraguay .. .... .. .. .. ...... .. .... .. 1,480 231 352 356 195 346 
Chile .. .. .... .... .... .. .... .... ...... 2,500 308 1,000 580 280 332 
Argentina ...... .. ................ 350 70 66 74 94 46 
Uruguay . . . .. . .. .... . . 200 105 95 
Brazil*· .. . .. . .. . . .. ... 4,700 795 816 1,363 326 315 169 916 
TOTAL ......... . .. 42,230 6,255 5,185 15,300 2,115 7,958 672 4,745 
* Includes public 2dministration, gen eral and miscellaneo us. 
** Includes part of ap propr iation for economic aid . 
The funds were distrihuted among broad fields of activity and single 
projects ,according to the <desires of host governments. Unavoidably, they have 
been spread rrather thin in relation to the vast scope of the program. 
The success of the program has been most striking in the field of health 
and sanitation. Hospitals have been built, health centers organized, facilities 
for enviro,nmental sanitatirOn introduced, campaigns waged against malaria 
and contagious diseases. Great attention has been given to the training of local 
personnel on all levels. Latin Amerioa is studded with medical institutions 
that have grown out of "servicios" founded ·by the IIAA. The wo~k, however, 
is far from completion. Even in such prosperous nations as B~azil and Mexico, 
there remain vast ·areas with pathetically inadequate health conditions, while 
sanitation and health services in less developed countries are often limited 
to cities 'and very little progress has heen made in rural areas. 
We had occasion to observe the medical and sanitation wo'rk of the United 
States missions, with American and looal personnel, in various Latin American 
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countries, especially along the Pacific coast, and talked about this work with 
local intellectuals. We heard very little adverse oriticism of the program and 
many laudatory com,ments, but our impression is that the job has just begun 
and the work of the U. S. missions in this field should be glfea.tly expanded, 
particularly in · the villages. 
The educational work of the U. S. missions is conoentrated on vocational 
and technical training in special schO'ols and centers 'and in classes added to 
regular schools. The United States has also helped in organizing "normal 
schools" for training teachers. 
In Peru and Bolivia, we visited "nuclear schools" developed in rural areas 
with the aid of our missions. Elementary rural sooO'ols are grouped in clusters, 
"nuclei," attached to a central sohool. The latter provides four grades of 
elementary education, and supervision and leadership to the attached schools, 
which have classes for one or two grades. Of course, this arrangement is a far 
AN UNFINISHED RURAL SCHOOL BUILT BY PEASANTS IN BOLIVIA 
cry from a sound system of elementary education with from four to six grades 
in each school, but it represents a step forward in areas where not more than 
20 per cent of the boys and girls enrolled in the first class have a chance to 
complete the second year, and not more than 5 or 10 per cent go as far as 
the fourth grade. 
In some cases, the U. S. missions have saved local school systems from 
serious difficulties. In one oountry, for example, all rural schools were on 
the verge of being closed for lack of funds to pay the teaohen;' salaries. A 
grant of $2 million arranged by the mission prevented the collapse of the 
rural school system. 
Our missions have also provided another form of assistance to elementary 
education by helping farmers in remote villages to build schools without 
financial support from the Ministry of Education. After the walls of the build-
ing have been raised, the local autholrities usually agree to provide tiles for 
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the roof, and with the school's building completed, the Ministry of Eduoation 
is willing to provide a teacher. 
Such forms of assistance in the field of primary education testify to a very 
low level of eduoation in respective areas. But this is precisely the merit of 
this system-it brings aid to people where such a-id is most urgently needed. 
We ,also saw traces of 'work of the U. S. missions in schools on all levels: 
equipment for teaching physics, for toohnical training in high schools and 
colleges, labor.atories, electrical and optical instruments, movie PTojectors, etc. 
Technical !assistance in the field of industry inoludes specialized training, 
distribution of simple maohinery and introductiQn of certain branches of 
production such 'as brick, cement, glass, fertilizers and canning. This program 
does not undertake the more ambitious industrial proj oots, such as building of 
power stations ,and 'steel mills. 
Most diversified is the aotivity of our techuioal assistance in the field of 
agriculture. It ranges from efforts to improve living conditions in villages, 
,distribute fertilizer, improve seed and cattle breeds, to far-reaching prQjects 
of resettlement as in Guatemala, and regional development, as ,in ChilIan, 
Chile. Pemaps, the greatest ,achievement 'Of our agricultural experts has been 
in gaining the oooperation of local agricu1tural colleges in training students 
for extension work in the villages. In Ecnado,r, they took an aotive part in 
establishing a sohool for tropical agriculture for the sons of looal farmers. 
Moreover, the work of the missions in villages lost in the Andes or tropical 
jungles starts at a level of misery at which technical assistance c·annot be 
separated -trom sanitary or welfare Wlork or hasic education. We visited vil-
lages where agricultural extensiojIl agents ·are engaged in campaigns to' intro-
duce elementary stoves for cooking or bedsteads in farm houses, or to teach 
farmers to out an opening in the wall to let light into the roo·m. Such a hole 
in the wall, the first step for introducing windows with glass panes, may mark 
the beginning of a cultural revolution in a village. We saw such "improved" 
houses but had no opportunity :to observe the impact of the innovation on the 
villagers. The head of one U. S. mission told us of his visit to a village where 
the first opening was made in an adobe hut. A erowd of women in front of 
the building were almost overwhelmed by emotion : Was this not a miracle? 
Sunlight in the house! 
We ourselves saw a farmhouse in which a hedstead four inches high had 
Ibeen installed for the first time. There was no other furniture-no chairs, no 
benches, no tables. People sat and had slept on the dirt floor, bitterly oold 
at night in that Andean village. 
We-toured villages in the company of local agronomists tr,ained by Point 
Four technicians, all young, full of ener'gy and enthusias'm. We saw them at 
work with our people. This was one of the brightest, most encouraging im-
pressions we had during our trip. 
UN and OAS Technical Assistance: Along with the Point Four missions, 
otlier organizations are ·at work in similar fields in Latin America. The United 
Nations is represented mainly by UNESCO, WHO and F AO. Their contribu-
tion is noteworthy although their work is stretched too thinly and the means 
at their disposal are utterly inadequate-some $4 million to be divided among 
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haH a dozen agencies in fifteen or more countries! It seems that lack of funds 
has compelled the UN agencies to concentrate on shorl-run prQject~ Their 
missions come and go. We saw many reports prepared by such missions, 
usually full of excellent advice to the local governments on what they should 
or should not do. Perhaps such recommendations were followed through or 
at least had some impact on the thinking of local governments, but I heard 
nothing to this effect. 
Comparing my impressions of the toohnical assistance w(}rk of our missions 
with that of the United Nations, I think that, apart from a different scale of 
activities, our missions have two advantages: Their work is done in close co-
operation with local people; they have a m'ore permanent character. " 
Among the ventures in technical assistance hy the Organi~artion of Ameri-
can States, mention should he made of the Inter-American Housing Center 
(CINV A). Its emphasis is on the development of plans and toohniques . for 
building low-cost houses, often on the basis of self-aid, for -families .and 
communities now living in conditions of humiHating poverty. The work of 
the Center is closely associated with that of Technical Assistance mission. 
Often the technical ideas of the Center are brought to the people and trans-
formed into reality by the workers of lCA. These ideas are very" simple: use 
of local building materials; economical use of cement blocks; role of social 
workers in housing projects; organization of "cooperatives" for , building 
houses with one's own hands. At the time we visited the ClNVA headquarters 
'CINYA·RAM,' THE SOIL·CEMENT BLOCK MAKI.NG HAND "RESS 
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in Bogota, Colombia, its attention was focused on a new soil-cement block 
making -machine. This is a very primitive, clumsy-looking hand press that 
produces solid blocks out of almost any soil. It can be operated by two men, 
and if necessary by one m,an. It can be dismantled and transported on mule-
hack to inaccessible areas. It had been planned as la "do-it-yourself" device 
and can be made very oheap in mass production. Prospects are good that 
in a ,short time, thO'usands and 'perhaps a hundred thQusand suoh "sinve-Ram" 
presses will be put into actiQn, and millions of peQple thus enabled to' build 
better, weather-resistant dwellings fO'r themselves. When the CINV A workers 
e~plained to us the advantages of theiT machine, we shared their enthusiasm 
and felt that their press was a greater aohievement than SQme glamO'rous hQus-
ing projects. Indeed, the Center, working Qn a very mQdest budget, ooneen-
trates its .attentio,n ton improving the housing conditions of the maj ority of 
the populatiQn in Latin Amerioa, while mQst Qf the tambitiQus hQusing proj ects 
merely supply greater oQmfort to' thQse whO' can pay. 
EducatiQn and health prQblems have alsO' attracted variQus religious groups 
to Latin Amerioa. The National Planning AssociatiQn has estimated that mQre 
than 60 United States religious groups--Catholic, Protestant, Jewish and 
interdenQminational-are conducting prQgrams of health, education and agri-
culture in every cQuntry Qf Latin America, doing the equivalent Qf the full-
time wQrk of 2,000 technicians. They maintain over 100 hQspitals and nursing 
schools, sponSQr more than 1,000 primary schoQls, about ISO secondary 
schoQls, about 60 commercial and vocational schO'ols; they conduct Qver 40 
prQjects of agricultural extension education. Substantial oontributiQn in the 
field O'f health services is also being made by the Rockefeller and KellQgg 
F QundatiQns. 
Summary: Certain conclusions may be drawn frQm this outline Qf the 
PQsition Qf Latin America in world trade, its receipt of foreign capital and 
econQmic aid, and the toohnical assistance it Qbtains from the United States 
and international organizations. 
Latin America has nQt boon left without eoonO'mic and toohnical aid, and 
has not, I believe, been abused or mistreated by the United States in foreign 
tr'a,de. NQr has it been overlooked O'r slighted in th economic and technical as-
sistance programs of the United States and United NatiQns. There are certain 
defects, however, in our trade policy, in the flow Qf foreign investments and 
in the eoonO'mic and technioal assistance accQrded to' this area: 
• ruhe trade policy of the United States is determ~ned withO'ut regard to' 
its impact on the economy of Latin Amerioan nations. 
• The flow of private capital from the U. S. and Qther cQuntries to Latin 
America is utterly erratic from the ~poiIlit of view of IQcal peQple and tis Qften 
directed to' objectives that have nO'thing to' dO' with the ,needs of local economy. 
• The supply of public funds (WQrld Bank, Eximbank and U. S. Govern-
ment) fluctuates from year to' year and lacks the -continuity necessary for 
long-run planning. 
• The program Qf technical assistance has been conspicuously successful 
in some CQuntries but dQes nQt penetrate intO' Qther regions where it would 
be equally effective. 
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s. U. S. Policy In Latin America 
GEOGRAPHICALLY, Latin America is as remDte from the critical theaters Df glDbal strategy Df the Pentagon and the Kremlin as it is possible to be 
on Dur tiny planet in the atom age. This makes the objectives of United States 
policy in Latin America radically different frDm thDse in EurOope, Africa or 
Asia-an immense arena in which the West meets and clashes with the East. 
Whatever the final judgment of history abDut the nature of this clash, it ap-
pears to. us as the defense Oof freedom and civilizlatiDn -against hDstile forces. 
In view Df the Dverwhelming impOortance of this is'sue, the United States has 
felt cDmpelled tOo subDrdinate its foreign policy tOo global strategic require-
ments. The hDtter the cold wa.r becDmes, the more exacting becomes the 
military aspect of its fDreign pDlicy and the deeper the difference between 
the .objectives Df this policy in the Old WO'rld and Latin America. The main 
source Df vacillatiDn and apparent contradictiDns in our policy tDward the 
South is the fact that this policy is considered a part O'f Dur global strategy, 
which it is not. 
What is frequently represented as a change in the United States attitude 
toward Latin American nations has been the result of the reGrientation Df 
Dur general fO'reign pDlicy. Recall the Dutline of programs "fDr peace and 
freedom" in President Truman's inaugural address in January 1949: 
"First, we will cDntinue to give unfaltering sUppDrt to the United Nations 
and rellated agencies and we will continue to' search for ways tOo strengthen 
their authOority and increase their effectiveness .... 
"Seoond, we will continue our prO'grams for world economic recovery .... 
"Third, we will strengthen freedom-IDving nations against the dangers of 
aggression. . . . 
"Fourth, we must embark on a bold new program for making the benefits 
Qif our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the imprGve-
ment and growth of underdevelGped areas .... " 
The President further elaborated as follDws: 
"We shO'uld make available tOo peace-loving peoples the benefits of 'Our 
store of technical knowledge in Grder to help them to realize their aspirations 
for a better life. And, in cODperation with Dther natiDns, we should fDster 
capital investment in areas needing development. 
"Our ·aim should be to' help the ·free peDple O'f the world, thrOough their 'Own 
effGrts, tOo prGduce mOore food, more clDthing, more materi,als for hOousing 
and mOore mechanical power to' lighten their burdens .... 
"It must be a world-wide effOort for achievement Oof peace, plenty and free-
dom." 
The global' military policy (military aid to foreign cOountries) appears 
here as one of the four cOornerstOones Df foreign pO'licy, the Gther three being 
nOon-military: support of the United NatiOons, foreign economic aid and inter-
natiDnal technical assistance prDgram (PO'int Four). The particular objective 
Df United States pGlicy in Latin America cO'uld be clearly Ooutlined against 
the backgrOound Df points tWD and fDur O'f this progra.m .. 
WO'rld affadrs, however, have taken another turn. After the Korean War, 
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foreign economic aid and technical assistance were submerged under the 
concern abo.ut national security through military alliances and the armaments 
race. Seven years after Truman's inaugural address, the new President of 
the United States presented another philosophy o.f foreign policy in his 
Message to the Co.ngress on the Mutual Security Pro.gram: 
"The need fo.r a mutual security program is urgent because there are still 
nations eager to strive with us fo.r peace and freedom but, without our help, 
lack the means o.f doing so. 
"The need is urgent because there are still forces hostile to freedQm that 
QQmpel the free Wo.rld to. maintain adequate and coordinated military power 
to. deter aggression. 
"The need is urgent because there are still peoples who aspire to sustain 
their freedom but confront economic obstacles that are beyond their capabili. 
ties o.f surmounting alone." 
In view of these circumstances, the people of the United States were asked 
to make sacrifices ,fo.r military, technical and economic 'assistance to. Qther 
nations, with a strong emphasis on the military ,aspect of the mutual seourity 
pro.gram: 
"The So.viet maneuver . . . includes offer of bilateral trade arrangements 
,which ma.y involve provisions of arms and capital goods as well as technical 
assistance. . . . 
"Even when we welco.me respite from the Soviet policy of threat and 
violence we must take careful stock of what still remains of it. . . . There is 
nothing •.. to warrant a slackening of our efforts to strengthen the oommon 
defense of the free world. 
"In its new departures in foreign policy, we see that the Soviet Union 
continues in its familiar pattern of ceaseless prQbing for oPPQrtunities to 
~ploit politioal and eco.no.mic weaknesses. 
" ... With Soviet leaders openly proclaiming their world aim, it would 
be folly for us and QUI' friends to relax our collective efforts toward stability 
and security." 
The meaning of the principles established here as guidelines of U.S. foreign 
policy is not concealed by the reservation: "Needless to say, we do. not intend 
to' permit specific Soviet moves to contro.l our activities." Indeed, the whole 
p:vogram of mutual security is presented as a vigilant defense, and such a 
defense is unavoidably co.ntrolled by the moves of the ruthless and shrewd 
enemy. 
President Eisenho.wer's message co.ntained a special paragraph concerning 
Latin America : "We propose to. strengthen further the friendly relationships 
which exist with our sister republics in the South. I recommend that we con-
tinue to. encourage by technical assistance the programs initiated by the Latin 
American nations to make better use of their own resources." 
The relation of this proposal to the program of mutual ~ecurity is not 
very clear. The "Summary Presentation" of th · progr m published jointly 
by the Department of State, Department of Defense and International Cooper-
ation Administration fills this gap by explaining the importance of Latin 
meriea. to the United State~: 
"Latin American influence in the United Nations and in their international 
dealings, in support of peace, freedom and international justice, is a powerful 
force for world stability and peace. From the military point of view, the 
friendship and C(}()perati{)n of the nations of Latin America is essential to 
the defense of the whole hemisphere." 
Both arguments interpret the U.S. policy in Latin America as a part of 
global cold war. Actually, however, Latin America has no part in this clash 
of great powers. Thus, the U.S. policy in this part of the world is left hanging 
in midair, without an adequate ideological foundation. 
False Accusations The fact that the objectives of the United States in 
Latin America have not been firmly established, has deprived its policy in 
this area of internal consistency and made it an easy target for false accusa· 
tions. The Communists decry it as a policy of colonial expansion designed 
to grab the natural resources of the region. Others denounce the U,nited States 
for supporting reactionary forces in Latin American countries and arming 
local dictators. 
In my opinion, both accusations are false. It is ridiculous to speak of 
Yankee i.mperialism and oolonialism in Latin America in view of the example 
of Puerto Rico, which is, economically and politicaUy, one of the brightest 
spots in the ~ea. Equally absurd is the insinuation that U.S. economic aid 
to Bolivia and Guatemala o·r technical assistance to those countries plus 
Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Chile tends to subjugate these countries to 
monop01istic U. S. capital. Our survey of technioal assistance in Latin America 
shows clearly enough that this assistance contributes to the well-being of 
the peoples concerned and strengthens their independence. The accusation 
of colonial conspiracy ,by Point Four personnel is a lie as shameless as the 
acousation that milk distributed by the United States to school children in 
poverty-stricken villages in the Andes· is poisonous. 
The ,accusation that the United States is allying itself with reactionary forces 
is more serious. As a gener,al rule, our Emhassies are inclined to c:ultivate 
friendly relations with circles close to the government and the ruling party 
Partly because of the violence of the inter-party feud in some Latin Ameriean 
countries, they avoid association with the opposition. It cannot be denied 
also that they have manifested sympathy with some local dictators for their 
anti-Communist poliey and generosity toward American big businessmen. 
There is no evidence, however, that the United States has maintained 
dictators in power against the wishes of the people. Surely, the United 
States was not to blame for Rojas Pinilla in Colombia, Perez Jimenez in 
Venezuela, Somoza in Nicaragua, Trujillo in the Dominic-an Republic, Peron 
in Argentina, or Batista in Cuba. Its conciliatory role in the Guatemalan revo-
lution that ended the Arhenz regime cannot be described a~ a conspiracy 
against democracy in that country. 
True, the United States has given arms to some Latin American countrie~ 
which asked for military aid. The wisdom of this policy can be questioned. 
I t can be argued that the armies of Latin American republics, equipped with 
U.S. weapons, would be unable to defend themselves in the event of an attack 
b the Soviet , and that the respective governments are more- likely t u 
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their tanks and airplanes in clashes with sister republics and in internal 
struggles for power. It can be argued that the policy of maintaining armies 
in Latin American republics is fundamentally wrong and they might be 
advised to disarm under a mutual security pact enforced by the Organization 
of American States. This is, however, "a controversial issue. As long as Latin 
American countries feel that as independent nations they must maintain 
armed forces, the Uni,ted States cannot ,deny them weapons. Its military aid 
to Latin American countries, whether under democratic or dictatorial regime, 
has not gone beyond this general principle. 
I therefore do not believe that the United States is responsible for the 
existence of dictatorships in. Latin America, but it can be accused of lack of 
clarity and consistency in its attitude toward . political trends in this area. 
Dictatorial regimes are fonnidable r·oadblocks to progress in Latin America. 
This consideration should have determined the U. S. attitude toward them. 
Fallacies of U. S. Policy: The weaknesses of U.S. policy in Latin America 
stem from lack of clarity about its ultimate objectives. Indeed, its policy seems 
to be directed by oonsiderations which fail to inspire confidence in its sincerity 
~such as global strategy in cold war, promotion of export goods and capital, 
and the sympathy of the United States Government for certain slogans and 
disapproval of others. 
Global Strategy: Whether or not the philosophy of mutual secuvity which 
epitomizes Qur global strategy is sound in Europe and Asia, it is a 
matter of record that it does not apply to Latin America. The evidence is 
provided by the actual share of Latin America in total U. S. outlays under 
the various mutual security programs (in millions o.{ dollars) : 
Appropriations lor Mutual Security, 1957 
Worlel Latin America 
The whole program .. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .. .. . ~861 96 
Military assistance and defense support .. . ~131 35 
Development assistance .... .. ........ . .. . 572 27 
Technical assistance ... ... .. . ... . . ..... . 158 34 
Latin America's share is approximately 5 per cent of the develQpment 
assistance program, about 22 per cent of the technical assistance and less than 
1 per cent of military assistance and defense support. Its share in all forms 
of foreign aid is just 2 per cent, and this is a source of resentment in Latin 
that this area is no part in global strategy of the United States and c"onse-
America: The United States spends billions of dollars on foreign aid but only 
2 per cent of these funds go to Latin America. The plain truth, however, is 
that this ,area plays no part in U. S. global strategy and conse-
quently has little importance in its military program. Latin America's share 
in total foreign aid appropria~ions seems humiliatingly 10'W because of 
the misleading classification of these appropriations. 
The Senate Committee on FQreign Relations, in -its Final Report on Tech-
nical Assistance, 1957, suggested a threefold classification of related pro-
grams: 
"1. Military assistance'--anything from jet planes to shoe laces delivered 
directly to military forces. 
"2. Economic assistance-anything in the f.onn of capital equipment or 
investments. 
"3. Technical assistance---anything in the form of knowledge, technique or 
know-how." 
It can -be argued, however, that the difference in the purpose of appropria-
tions is more significant than materi-al supplied. Military aid, ~or example, 
may include military training of the natives-a transfer of technical know-
how. Similarly, when the United States offers to assist an allied government 
in strengthening the bridges on certain strategic routes., in OIrder to make 
them passable fOir heavy tanks and artillery, this is a clear case of military 
aid in the guise of economic assistance. 
The Final Report of the Com1mittee points out · that a reason for the dis-
tinction between economic aid ' and defense support may well be the feeling 
. on the part of the Administration that something smacking of military aid 
is easier to sell to the Congress, and the feeling on the part of Congress that 
military aid is more easily sold to the public. The Report expresses the con-
viction that "both Congress and· the public are wiser and more mature than 
this sort of semantics implies.. If the eco,nomic development of country X 
is in the national interest of the United States, the,n economic assistance can 
be justified on these grounds, without straining the case to east it into"a mili-
tary mold." _-: 
This observation is correct hut does not go far enough. It may leave the 
impression that each policy.-decision in -the field of foreign aid and even each 
single project must be approached-. from the angle ()f the national interest of 
the United States. As long as such an interpre~ation is possible, foreign eco-
nomic aid remains subordinated to the global strategy o.f this oountry, and 
its policy in Latin America is left with()ut guidance. There must be no "ifs" 
in decisions on foreign aid. The United States interest in roonomic and social 
progress in a region must be firmly established in advance. It may be more 
immediate in one region than in others, and this difference must be taken 
into account in the geographical distribution of funds. But implementation 
and administration must be determined by the needs and interests of receiving 
oountri.es, without any reference to special interests of the United States. 
Promotion of Exports: Economic aid and technical assistance are often j usti-
fied as a means for opening new outlets abroad for U.S. products and capital. 
The Final Report of _ the Senate Committee dramatizes this argument by a 
chart which argues: "The More Developed the Country ... The Better Cus-
tomer It Is." Latin America is conspicuous by its absence froOm this chart. 
Were it .included, it would have occupied a place above the United Kingdom 
and Germany, which proves clearly enough- the fallacy of the export argu-
ment. Indeed, the per capita export from the United States to different coun-
tries depends on many factors: the structure of their ooonomies, their need 
for articles exported by the United States. competitive position of these articles 
on the world market 'and so forth. The "and so forth" includes, among otiher 
things, the level of economic development of the respective country: Other 
conditions being equal, the demand of a country for U. S. products is 
likely to increase with the growth of its national income. This general tendency 
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is illustrated by the following comparison of the value of our exports to Latin 
America and Canada in 1957' 
Population (in million) .... .... . .. . ...... . 
Exports from the United States 
Total {millions of dollars} .. . .. .... . .. . . 
Per inhabitant (dollars) ....... . ..... . . 
Canada 
16.6 
3,879 
234 
Latin America 
193.7 
4,487 
23 
In this general form, the argument shows only thal the United States need 
nDt fear that economic development and indusrialization of Latin America 
will reduce its market abroad. Nevertheless, although rising prosperity ~ and 
industrializ'ation in a country may inere~~ U.S. exports, this is not an 
immediate, automatic reactiDn. The United States cannDt expect that 'each 
million dollars it invests in economic aid in a country will. increase its future 
exports to that country by $100,000 or even hy ten cents a year. Perhaps the 
country receiving our aid will substitute domestic products for those cur-
rently imported from the United States, Dr make purchases in West Gennariy 
or haly. To invest public funds in railroads, highways, agriculture or health 
in a country in the hope that this operation will bring returns iIi the fDrm: Df 
increased future exports is a very duhious speculatiOn. . 
Furthennore, if there were a strong correlation between U.S. eConomic 
aid in Latin America and the volume of U.S. exports to that region in the 
more or less remote future, there would rem'ain the crucial question of whether 
we need to take special measures for increasing our exports. U.S. "exports of 
merchandise currently run far a.bove our imports, as the following figures 
show: 
Year Export Import Surplus 01 e~pofts 
1951 ........... . ................ 14.9 10.9 4.0 
1952 .. ....... .. ..................... 15.1 10.8 4.2 
1953 ... . ................... ... . .. ... 15.7 10.9 4.8 
1954 ........ .. . . .......... . ...... 15.0 10.3 4.7 
f955 ... . ... . .. .. ... ... .... .. ... 15.4 11.4 4.0 
1956 .... ...... . ...... . ...... 18.9 12.6 6.3 
1957 20.6 13.0 .. I -, ·7:6 ... ! . .. ..... .......... . . . .. . ........ . . 
_ , I I 
Total, 1951-1957 ... . ............ 115.6 80.1 35.5 
The cumulative value of U.S. exports has exceeded that of imports. I;.y $35 .. 5 
billion in the past seven years. What advantage has this impressive' trade 
bal~nce brought to the nation? Actually, the United States h~s ,giv:en ';aw'ay 
domestic products worth $115.6 billion for foreign products . worth , $&0.1 
billion. * But, apart from .other items in the balance of payments" a su:ip~s of 
e)(port~ oyer imports results . in the accumulation of holdings 'abroad, :_ whi~h 
is , f~vorahle 9nly fqr a nation that plans-at some later 'time-to .t~e 'th~ 
profits from its ,foreign investments in the ~onn of hnPo~' In oth~r words, 
*The lIurplu8 in export of merchandise and invisible export (transportation cod, profits from . foreign in· 
vestment and so on) wall partly balan.eed by foreign aid, special conditions in export of agricult~ral Burplus 
commodities, and accumulation ~f holdings of U .~. corporations abroad. 'Thi~ does not hrvali~at;e the' a.rgument 
that outlets for U.S. merchandise ahtoad exceed by far the ability or willingnell of tb.e~ni,t~~ , Stat!!s to im. 
port. ' , I '\ ,. 
the only economic justificatio.n ' of a temporary surpluS of eXPo.rt is that it 
will permit the country to. impo.rt more in the future than it eXPo.rts. Since 
there is no. indicatio.n that the United States will reverse its balance o.f trade in 
the dooades to. co.me, its chance to. reco.ver the current surplus of eXPo.rts 
o.ver imports is very doubtful. 
In general, the weak Po.int o.f U.S. foreign trade is no.t the lack of outlets 
abro.ad hut the 0ontinuo.us excess of eXPo.rts o.ver hnpo.rts. The sensible go.al 
of our fo.reign trade Po.licy therefore is to narrow o.r clo.se this gap by increas-
ing nnpo.rts, reducing eXPo.rts o.r bo.th. Subo.rdinatio.n 'Of o.ur fo.reign aid 
policy to. the search o.f new o.utlets is contrary to this goal. 
Thus, the defense of foreign aid as a means ,fo.r increasing eXPo.rts gets a 
strange twist: The United States is invited to spend public money in o.rder 
to. expo.rt more and mo.re, although each inorement in export represents an 
additional lo.ss. Of co.urse, the United States must export, in order to. co.ver 
the imports of currently needed raw materials and tro.pical pro.ducts. But the 
admonitio.n to. help o.ther co.untries in order to. ~ncrease our exports is inco.n-
gruous. 
Promotion of U. S. Investments: Pr~sident Ejsenh~wer's ~~ssage o.n ~e 
mutual security program urged: "We must co.ntinue to. s~imulaie expansion 
of trade and investment in the free world. We must continue helpin'g ~o build 
the pro.ductive capacities o.f free natio.ns thro.ugh public ~oans and guarantees 
of private investment." In plain words, this meant that the Go.vern,ment would 
SUPPo.rt the ' eXPo.rt o.f go.o.ds and capital thro.ugh pl:lbl,ic lo.an~ ~d ' ~aran~~s. 
Stimulation of the eXPo.rt of go.ods thro.ugh public loans is, Hl~eed, ,the ob-
jective of the EXPo.rt-Impo.rt Bank, and there Wo.uld be no. ,o.,bjectio.n t<;> Co.l?-
tinuati'on o.f its operatio.ns. Public guaran'tees o.f private investments abroad 
is ano.ther matter. If the Government ~'an ' give such guarant~s to a co.ncern 
building a facto.ry abroad, why sh~uld , it not gu~rantee the , pro.fif~-: of, an 
private concerns within the United States? And, generally, ~hy ' and to.: w.ha~ 
extent is the United States interested in pro.mo.ting the o.utflo.W of ~apita~~ 
and occasio.nally the flight of capital-from this country to. the happy 'lands 
where there is no. profits tax and payment of o.ther taxes i's ieft' t~~ the 'dis-
cretio.n o.f capitalists? What do the people o.f the United States ge~, ultimately, 
fro.m investment o.f natio.nal capitai abro.ad? Would ' it not be preferable t~ 
let this capit'al work in do.me~tic indu~tri~ where it Wo.uld s_trengthe~ 'Co.in-
petition amo.ng private co.ncerns, co.ntribute to. the r'ise of pro.du_cti~tyl ;alrid 
counteract inflatio.nary pressures which ' cause a co.ntinuous rise of .prid6s? 
With all these co.nsideratio.ns in mind, it is difficult to. understand why 'the 
pro.mo.tio.n o.f private investment abro.adappears o.~ the' "must" list hf- ou~ 
mutual security program. ' . " 
In a perio.d o.f acute deflation, the o.utflow o.f ' capital 'as wei! ,as an eXPo.rt 
halance are beneficial fo.r a co.untry; when inflatio.nary pressure prevails~ 
they' are undesirable. Simila.rIy, inflo.w ' of investment to. a 'certain indu~ry 
may be welcome to a receiving country, while inflow to. other econoffiic fields 
may be harmful. So.me foreign investments are gratifyIng; o.thers are bound 
to. pro.voke resentment in the receiving country. Under certain 'conditions, 
large-scale investment of U.S. capital may strengfuen o.ur ties with friendly 
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countries, while under other conditions it is more l~kely to cause friotion. 
During our stay in Buenos Aires, I had oocasion to read a 120-page con-
cession contract awarded by the Peron Government to a U.S. oil corporation. 
I was told that Peron intended to use this contract to pave the way for another, 
muoh higger concession, which he would have given later to an Argentine 
concern controlled hy himself and his family. The contract with the U.S. 
corporation gave full protection to the concessionaire while providing prac-
tically none for Argentina and-according to this story-was designed to 
provoke criticism within the country and to permit Peron's group to appear 
on the scene with an offer to exploit the oHfields on more favorable condi-
tions for the nation than those asked by the Yankees. If this story is true, 
Peron's stooges overplayed their hand; the concession produced such an 
outburst of protest that it could not be ratified. Indeed, it accelerated the 
downfall of the dictator. 
One can imagine what the impact of this concession on public O'pinion 
in Argentina and other Latin American countries would have been if it had 
been ratified. Would it not have confirmed the Communist charges of the 
arrogance of Yankee imperialists? 
To sum up, investment O'f U.S. capital in foreign countries is neither hidden 
aggression nor a blessing fO'r the receiving nations. It has nO'thing in com-
mon with the U.S. mutual security program. Neither encouragement nor 
discouragement O'f the O'utflow of U. S. capital -shO'uld :be an objective of our 
foreign policy in any 'part of the world-least O'f all in Latin America. 
Promotion of Economic Slogans: M,any U.S. representatives in Latin Amer-
ica believe that a country's pro-United States attitude must be expressed by 
the abstentiO'n O'f its gO'vernment from intervention in econO'mic affairs, its 
reliance on private initiative, and its hospitality toward foreign investments. 
If, on the other hand, a government decides to reserve exploration of oilfields 
to itself or relies on public regiO'nal development programs, these are mani-
festatiO'ns of its anti-American tendencies, perhaps of pro-Communist 
orientation. 
It is difficult to understand this reasO'ning. This country is nO't properly 
concerned with public or priv:ate O'wnership of industries in Great Britain, 
Germany, France and Japan and is nO't in the least inJterested in the ways in 
which Brazil, Mexico or Chile sO'lve this problem. As far as the exploitation 
of O'ilfields and mines is concerned, the U.S. Government may feel its obli-
gatiO'n to' defend the interests O'f its citizens if they are subjected to discrimi-
natory treatment or threatened with arbitrary expropriation of their property. 
Except fO'r such a situation, it has no reason to prefer any particular form of 
enterprises in respective ecO'nomic sootO'rs in foreign countries. Certainly, 
exploitation O'f Brazilian oil reserves by a Dutch or a British corporation 
presents no advant,age to the United States over their exploitation by an 
autO'nomous public ,agency. The United States cO'uld O'ppose a national 
monopoly of O'il exploitation in a fOTeign country ()lilly if it were interested 
in the penetration of its private capital into this field. But, from the point of 
view of natiO'nal interest, the United St,ates gains nothing either from outflow 
of. capital or its investment in· this particular industry. 
so 
The same reasoning should be applied to public projoots of regional 
development. Those who dislike expansion of the economic responsibilities 
ot the Government in this oountry are inclined to dislike similar projeots 
abroad. But this should be a question of personal opinion rather than a matter 
of foreign policy. 
The attitude of U.S. representatives in Latin America on such problems 
as public or private ownership of industrial plants and public or private 
exploitation of mineral resources can be described as an attempt to export 
to Latin America slogans which have been rej ected by our allies in Europe 
and are an apple of discord in U.S. internal politics. Injection of these issues 
into our policy in Latin America does not strengthen the prestige of this 
country among governments and intellectuals in these nations. 
The U. S. Goal: Thus, the goal of the United States in Latin America is 
not to extend the cold war, to promote the U. S. exports, to protect and 
build up U. S. investments, to befriend and support pro-big-business govern-
ments or any particular eCDnomic doctdne. What, then, does Latin America 
mean to the United States in the long run? 
The two areas cDmplement one another, one being located essentially in 
the m.oderate zone while the bulk of the other belongs to the tropical and 
subtropical zones. This relationship may becolne irrelevant ~n the remote 
future, but it will remain of decisive impDrtance for many deoades to come. 
The two areas, together with Canada, form a tightly knit geDgraphic and 
economic region. Anglo-Saxon Amerioa relies on Latin Amerioa fDr tropical 
produce, and Latin America finds outlets in Anglo-Saxon America for its 
fruits and minerals. Despite the progressive diversificatiDn of production and 
trade of Latin American countries, this tie is bound tD become even stronger 
as time goes on, with progress in transportation and commu,nioation, and ,it 
will be further streng,thened by the increasing econDmic cooperatiDn of 
Europe and Africa. The trend in the world economy is toward formation Df 
two economic blocs, both stretching from pole to pole and fac~ng each other 
across the Atlantic. The hard fact of life is that :the United States -and Latin 
Amerioa find themselves in the same living space and must develop their 
regional economy within these limits. 
The United States is, therefore, vitally interested in economic progress 
in Latin America, in the development of its agriculture and mining, cities 
and villages, highways and rivers, in political stahility and the standard 
of living of its peoples. Likewise, it is interested in maintaining the 
economic unity of the Western Hemisphere in view of the tact that U. S. 
mineral reSDurces will be partly deplet~d or dose to exhaustiDn in the not 
very remote :future. 
On the other hand, :the United States cannot ~nd must: not try to mold 
the development of Latin American nations in accordance with the interests 
and ideas of its businessmen. The pattern of development in that area w.ill 
be determined by its peoples, their governments and their intellectuals. Latin 
America's historical hackground is different fronl that of the United States 
and Canada and will remain different. It will overcome features of its 
colonial heritage which have become an obstacle to its economic ·and social 
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progress, but will nOit renounce other aspects of its cultura1 tradition. The 
close association of the two Americas, so different as they are, will enrich 
both of them culturally. Latin America will profit from the North American 
genius for organization (superior technology being only one manifestation 
of this genius), while the United States will prnfit f.rom the a'ftistic spirit of 
its Southern neighbors. 
Taking stock of the economic, social and political trends in Latin America, 
the United States must realize their significance for its own future and that 
of the Hemisphere. Economic progress, industrialization, political stability, 
improvement .of the educational system, better health cond.itions, higher 
standards of living and-last but not least-adjustment of the people's at-
titudes, economic praotices ~ politioal institutions to' the requirements of 
modem times, are essential nOit .only fOir the wellbeing of Q1ur sister republics 
but f.or the sound progress of the whQlle hemisphere, from the Arotic to the 
Antarotic and from the Atlantic to the Pacific. 
The SUPPO'rt of these trends in Latin American na,tions must be coo-
sidered the goal and guide line of the U,nited States policy in this area. 
Friendship, mutual confidence and affection oannot be bQlught by loans and 
gralIlts but will grow Qut Q1f Q1ur understanding, sympathy ·and respect fQlr 
the 'Other party. These feelings, however, must be expressed in deeds. Once 
the United States has recognized its interest in the current evolution Qf Latin 
America, it must ·accept certain responsibilities for accelerating 'and facili-
tating this development. This postulate is not limited to foreign economic 
aid 'and technical assistance, but also includes certain adj ustments in our 
foreign trade PO'licy as far as it affects ,the interests Q1f Latin American na-
tions. The United States cannot be expected to detennine its toode policy 
by other cO'nsideraitiO'ns than its own interest, bUJt its interest demands 00,11-
sideratiOin for the needs of Latin America. In m·atters affecting U. S. trade 
with this ,region, no decision should be taken without proper consultation 
with the Latin America governments. 
Latin American Requests: It would be unfair to accuse U. S. policy in 
Latin America of disreg'a.rding the desires of the local peoples. All economic 
aid loans and emergency grants have been accorded in resPQlnse to requests 
of the local governments; all technical assistance proj eets have been either 
initiated or aotively supported by these governm.ents. And yet, our Latin 
American neighbors complain that what the United States does in Latin 
America is not always in accord with its most insistent desires and requests. 
For example, a local government may be concerned about the projeots A, B 
and C, .appraising their urgency in Ithat order. For some reason the United 
States may decline to help the looal government in projects A and B, but 
be willing to support project C. Its contribution will be politely accepted 
by the government, but may provoke more resentment than gratitude in the 
people. The United States should therefore establish machinery which will 
permit it to contribute most efficiently to the drive of Latin American 
nations toward economic improvement, payi,ng attention not only to their 
needs but also to their feelings. . 
What are their needs? What do they expect from the United States? 
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The recent Buenos Aires Economic Conference failed to answer these ques-
tions. More recently, luscelino Kubitschek, President of Brazil, has as-
sumed the role of spokesman for Latin America in formulating its aspi:r.a-
tions. He offered four points of discussion at a Latin American summit 
conference : 
1. Intensified investments in backward areas. 
2. Doubled technical assistance. 
3. Stabilization of pmces for basic Latin American products on the U. S. 
market. 
4. Liberaliz'ation of the lending policies of international finance organiza-
tions. 
Later, he listed seven points for the immediate attention of Washington 
and Latin American oountries: Need of private capital in underdeveloped 
areas; an increase in public loans, which would presumably include creation 
of an Inter-Amerioan Development Bank; strengthening of the internal 
economies in Latin American cou,ntries; the effect of Europe's Common 
Market on the America'S; creation of an all-American common market; 
technical assistance. 
The new program differs from the o,riginal four points by greater precision 
and addition of 'the questions of a common market in Europe 'and the Western 
Hemisphere. Perhaps new points will be added in the cou~se of preparation 
of the conference but, from the point of view of the United States, the 
problems raised can be conveniently classified under the headings of trade 
and aid policy. 
Prices and Tariffs: The pr~nciple that the United States is interested in 
the economic progress of Latin Amerioa implies that it should give due con-
sideration to the vital interests of its neighbors in the South in fixing duties 
and quotas for coffee, sug.ar, tin, copper, lead, zinc and some other articles. 
The administration of Reciprocal Trade Agreements rests on the idea of 
compromise between the conflicti,ng interests of various U. S. economic 
groups and, occasionally, of various geographic regions of the United 
States. Now, the voices of Latin American nations should be added to those 
to which the Administration is supposed to listen. Invited to defend their 
cause at open hearings, the representatives of Latin America,n nations would 
have an opportunity to become familiar with the procedures followed by 
this country in solving problems of foreign trade and would learn the 
reasons which may compel it to make decisions contrary to their desires. 
The same principle applies to the problem of stabilizing prices of certain 
Latin America.n produots on the U. S. market. The problem can be solved 
either by worldwide commodity agreements or by regiGnal-multilateral or 
bilateral-agreements. Both possibilities should be explored. Each agree-
ment presents certain advantages to and requires some concessions from 
bGth parties. The attitude of the United States Government toward com-
modity a.greements has been negative, 'aIlld! it can be anticipated that it 
will try to limit the SCGpe and duration of suoh arrangements. But ,it will 
make a grave mistake if it does not heed the point of view of Latin 
American nations. Its concessions must be based Gn the notion that the 
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agreements would cause comparatively small losses .to the United States 
while ·at the same time protecting the other side .against serious .economic 
dislocations. 
Common Market: The Americas can hardly do much now about the Com-
mon Market in Europe, although Latin America,n nations-especially those 
exporting coffee-are seriously concerned about its possible effect on their 
exports. They believe that a European Common Market which includes a 
large part, or the whole, of Africa, will be practically closed to their coffee. 
An AU-American Common Market would at least leave them the American 
market. 
It is doubtful whether this problem permits a solution wholly agreeable 
to ·all parties concerned. It must be kept in mind that Latin America ac-
counts for 25-30 per oent of U. S. foreign trade, while Europe, its overseas 
dependencies and members of the British Commonwealth account for 60-65 
per cent. This relationship makes it impossible for the United States to 
participate in an all-American customs union. More realistic are pending 
projects ooncerning a Latin American Common Market, or a Common 
Market for Central America. The United States ought to support such 
projects, short of direct participation, and try to accommodate Latin 
Amerioan ooffee producers by a commodity agreement. 
Private Investments: President Kubitschek's program stresses the need for 
intensified private investment in "hackward areas." His meaning is not very 
clear. Neither Brazil and Mexioo nor Colomhia and Chile consider them-
selves backward. Other La-tin American nations recognize that their economy 
is underdeveloped but would protest against being described as backward. 
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However, all Latin Amerioan nations are keenly aware that they have some 
backward spots. Does President Kubitschek invite private capital to those 
particular areas, or does he mean ,that investment is welcome in any economic 
sector and any area of Latin America? The vagueness of his proposal may 
be intentio:nal: He raises the question without revealing his own attitude 
toward it. 
The United States Government faces a difficult pro,blem. Since it is ex-
pected to protect all U. S. citizens abroad, its embassies must, among other 
things, defend the legitimate rights of U. S. businessmen. But they must 
make it clear to everybody that they represent not the capital but the people 
of the United States. During our trip thvough Latin America we met U. S. 
represenJt:atives who were keenly aware of this pIinciple, as well as others 
who were concerned primarily with U. S. investment abroad. 
The matter of private investment challenges not only the official repre-
sentatives of the United States in Latin America but also economists who 
visit this ·area. Too often they overemphasize the role of capital in economic 
progress, the relatio;nship between capital input and increment in national 
income, the magic power of private enterprise and the like. There may be 
some truth in their theories considered against the background of the United 
States, but in Latin America they sound like TV commercials and often 
provoke irritation and distrust in the listeners. 
Foreign Aid: Neither Presi,dent Kubitschek nor the economic conference 
in Buenos Aires asked the United States for grants or a new Marshall Plan 
for the Western Hemisphere. Rather, ,they asked for repayahle loans and 
expressed a strong q.esire to obtain such loans through an inter-American 
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financial ~nstitute. In public discussion of these requests, the idea of an 
inter-American development bank gained particular attention as the main 
issue of the forthcoming summit oonference, and when the U. S. Under-
Secretary of State for Economic Affairs annou,nced the willingness of this 
country to consider this plan, some Latin American diplomats welcomed this 
- lairly weak-promise as realization of an old dream of the sister-republics. 
This plan is old indeed, almost 70 years old. It appeared in discussions 
during the first International Co,nference of Amerioan States held in Wash-
ington in 1889-90. Subsequent inter-American conferences have returned, 
tllme and again, to this idea. No pr.actical steps have been taken in this 
direction. After World War II, the World Bank and International Monetary 
Fund .appeared on the scene. Since Latin American oountries are represented 
in ·both institutions, their operations in Latin America are somewhat similar 
to those which would be carried out by an inter-Amerioan Bank. The Exim-
bank development loans are of a similar chaflaoter. The attitude of the U. S. 
Government has therefore been that there is no need for a special inter-
American development bank. The Latin American nations ,have not shared 
this attitude, land a cleavage in opinions o,n this subject has .appeared in all 
inter-American conferences since 1950. This has been a very annoying point 
of disagreement, since the United States could be portrayed as denying 
fi,nancial aid to Latin American countries. 
The funds of an inter-American development bank cannot be pflovided by 
pooling the financi,al resources of Latin Amerioa-with Br.azil lending money 
to Ecuador, Ecuador extending credit to Argent~na ·and Argentina financing 
development proj eets in Mexico. Substantially, the bulk of funds must come 
from the United Staltes. * The question is whether aD/d to what extent the 
United States will foot the bill and how the new institution will administer 
the funds. 
If the U;nited States decides to support economic development in Latin 
Amerioa, it wiH have to clarify its attitude ,to two problems: first, the com-
parative advantages of loans and grants; seoond, the merits and disadvantages 
of aid to the host country through bilateral agreements and through a ,special 
inter-American .agency. 
The distinction between loans 'and gra,nts is more important to the re-
ceiving than to the giving oountry. A loan which will ,be repaid by the re-
ceiving government in local currency in 40 years must be financed by 
the giv,~ng oountry in precisely the same way as a grant. Ultimately, it is 
underwritten by the taxpayers, and the latter ·are entitled to know how 
their money is spent and what their country gets for it. More than in any 
ther field of public finance, the best policy in this case is that of honesty 
and frankpess: The people must know what each appropriation means. 
From the purely financial point of view, there is little difference for the 
United States between loans and g:r:ants, direct and indirect aid, economic 
and toohnical assistance: The people of the United States are asked to give 
• The United States currently contributes 70 per cent of the funds to the technical cooperation program. 
of the Organization of American States. Half of the remainder is underwritten by Brazil and Argentina and 
the rest is distributed among eighteen member nations . 
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up a small fractiDn-perhaps, Dne-tenth Df Dne per cent- Df their income 
to suppDrt economic progress, peace ,and prosperity in the Western Hemi-
sphere, a part Df which is the United States itself. Training teachers and 
building schoDls, agricultural extensiDn services and irrigatiDn projects; in-
struc~g farmers and supplying them with agricultural implements; develDp-
ing health centers and establishing hDspitals; training sanitatiDn employes 
and providing cities with pDtable water, are parts .of the same program, al-
though the outlays may be segregated fDr adnnnistrative and budgetary 
reasons. 
If our analysis Df the present phase Df econDmic develDpment Df Latin 
Amerioa is cDrrect, if the peculiarity and greatest weakness of the local 
eCDnomy lies in its uneven, lopsided devel.opment, then financial and tech-
nical aid are mDst urgently needed in the same economic sectors and the 
same areas, and .the success of a proj oot depends on i,ntegratiDn Df all 'aspects 
of developmental effDrts. More specificaily, the mDre emphasis is put Dn 
regional development, the clDser shDuld be the cDordination hetween financial 
and technical assistance. CDordinatiDn is essential not Dnly fDr regional 
development prDj ects of the TVA type but alsO' for large-scale resettlement 
and rehabilitatiDn plans, and mDst of all fDr broad regiDnal programs such 
as thDse vaguely envisaged in Brazil, Chile and Mexico. 
In view of the special interest of the United States in Latin America, prO'-
grams fDr this area must be integrated independently of the glohal U. S. 
strategy. A regional center might be established, for example, fDr MexicO', 
Central America and the Carib beans; anDther ·fDr Venezuela, CDlombia, 
EcuadDr, Peru, BDlivia and Paraguay; ·a third for Chile, Argentina and 
Uruguay; and a fourth fDr Brazil. Perhaps the number of regiD,ns should 
be increased and individual natiDns grouped in anDther way. The essential 
principle is cDDrdination Df all fDrms Df forei:gn aid, Dn a brDader scale than 
small independent republics. 
Economic Aid: Economic aid in the fDrm Df blank checks to' the govern-
ments Df Latin American countries wDuld nDt contribute much to' the 
economic develDpment Df the continent and, in the IDng run, may prDve 
harmful. ECDnomic planning in this area has not reached the level Dn which 
each IDcal gDvernment can ask an inter,natiDnal agency to' underwrite its 
develDpmental budget. I.t can request foreign loans Dnly for clearly described 
prDjects whioh it cannot carry out with its own financial reSDurces. The 
proper fDnn of aid in thi,s situation has been developed hy the W DrId Bll1lk. 
The lending agency must carefully appraise each prDject. After an ,agree-
ment with the host government abDut the financing of the project, it wDuld 
Dpen credit for defraying a part Df expenses during a year or twO', with the 
.understanding that further credit wDuld be accorded if the prDjeot proceeds 
in accordance wi,th the established plan. Thus the lending agency assumes 
the right and obligatiDn to' oheck the prDgress of the prog]}am in the same 
way as a private bank contrDls the use Df its loans by debtors. 
The United States could offer financial aid to' developmental plans of Latin 
America in the same way as the W DrId Bank, with twO' mDdifications: First, 
it could participate in certain IDng-range prDjeots ,Dn the basis of a clearly 
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defined cooperation agreement with the host government; seco,nd, it could 
underwrite in adv·ance a fund for installment payments over several years. 
The last type of arrangement is most suitable for large-scale regional projects. 
While supplementing the operations of the W o:rld Ba,nk and Eximbank, 
this form of economic aid would concentrate on proj eots which cannot be 
supponted by these ,agencies and are not within the scope of the International 
Monetary Fund. The scope of operations of the new development bank 
cannot be esti'mated 'at ,the present phase of the discussion. It must be estab-
lished on the hasis. of careful study of the financial needs and absorptive 
capacity of Latin America, taking linto account the experience of ,the W orId 
Bank ~n this area. It would be pointless to start operations with a fund which 
oould .be exhausted ·by two or three large allocations. Likewise, it would be 
harmlul to PUit at the disposal -of the bank funds which would induce it to . 
give loans for economioally unsound or doubtful projects. The l,imit of its 
ope:ratio,ns may be in the -order of magnitude of $250-300 mjllion a year, 
which would require a subscribed capital of $1-$1.5 billion. 
The essential point is to reconcile the desire of Latin America,n countries 
to get assistance through an inter-American lending agency and the luke-
warm ·atti.ttide of the United States toward such an agency. The new institu-
tion may act ,as an ~ntermediary between Latin American republics an.d the 
United States, or another lending government. Essential are the character 
and organization of the new inter-American center. 
It is obvious ,that a new bank which can become a foothall ~n local 
politics would bning more harm than good to Latin America. It can achieve 
its purpose only if it is absolutely independent and is insulated against 
political pressures. Such indepen,dence may be secured by a provision that its 
president must be appointed by the W orId Bank and selected ·:hom the r~nks 
of experts with international reputations who are not citizens of any American 
country. 
An arrangement can be worked out under which the United States would 
not be directly involved in eaoh loan neg.oti'ation and yet w-ould get sufficient 
moral 'and political credit for its participation in the drive of Latin American 
countrlies for economic revival. Perhaps the United States would prefer, ~or 
psychologioa'l tand political reasons, to carry out certain projects on the basis 
of direct cooperation with the host nation (as under the Point FOlllr program), 
while at the same time supporting the inter-Amerioan agency. The question ' 
of 'the relationship between the ,two types 0'£ operations is not clear at the. 
present phase of the discussion. But this muoh is certain: United States eoo-
nomk aid to Latin America, whether direct or through an inter-American 
body, must be oriented toward large-scale proj eets of unquestionable and 
lasting v'alue for the people of the respective oountries and must have no 
other purpose. 
Technical assistance: The Subcommittee on Technioal Assistance of the 
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations has found appropriate words in 
stressing the role of teohnical assistance in economic and social progress: 
"The determining factor is not economic development itself, but the whole 
complex of political and social i,nstitutions in which economic devel-opment 
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takes place 'and the social and political changes which .occur as a oonsequence 
of economic development. 
"Technical assistance is in the natio.nal interest of the United States when 
and only when it not only promotes eoonomic development but also. en-
<cowrages the growth of free institutions within the framework of a free 
society. 
"Technioal assistance in agriculture may result in sharp inoreases in crop-
yields, but it will fail of i,ts purpose (indeed, it may be positively harmful) 
unless it is accompanied by measures designed to bring about a fair distribu-
tion of the increases between landlo.rds and te;nants. In many underdeveloped 
countries, this means land reform. Otherwise soci'al stresses within the country 
may be inoreased, and Communist pro.paganda may find a greater receptivity 
as a result of technical assistance than it did before technical assistance was 
undertaken. 
"Similarlv, technical assistance in education may result in sharp increases 
in literacy, but again it will be less than fully effective if the school system is 
not adapted to meeting the country's needs. . . . MoreO'ver, it serves the 
national interests of neither the United States nor the recipient oountry to 
increase the number 0.£ holders of law and liberal arts degrees in an economy 
which may be ,already surfeited with frustrated intellectuals and needs 
plumbers and mechanics." 
The conclusion to be drawn fro.m .these observations should be that technical 
assistance must be a part of a broader program of economic aid. It should 
be ooordinated with support of developmental projects and fit into the general 
plan of cultur'al, social and economic progress in the area. 
It should be reoognized that the role of technical assistance in the progress 
of a country is not ,simply the transfer of ,better technology. The latter can be 
transferred to' backward areas mechanically by building factories, power 
stations, railroads and airports or by importing modern machinery, but these 
forms of transfer should not be considered technical assistance. The essential 
feature of ,technical assistance is that it deals with the human factor of 
economic progress and strengthens it by improving health conditions and 
teaching people to use their hands and brains efficiently for everyday tasks. 
In this respect, there is a great simHarity between our Point Four program 
and the Community Development movement in India. . 
If our observation is correot that poverty in certain parts of Latin Amerioa 
is due primarily to human factors rather than scarcity of natural . reSources 
and lack of capital, technical assistance is .the proper 'answer to the m'osf 
urgent problems in this 'area. Its scope should be extended, and the suggestion 
of President Kubitschek that the United States double i,ts appro.priations for ' 
this form of fo.reign aid in Latin America ,seems rather conservative. As the 
preceding chapter has shown, the technical assistance prog,ram has been 
highly successful in certain Latin American count,ries but has no.t been applied 
on a large scale in other areas. The next step should be its geographic 
extension, especially in the underdeveloped sections of such countries as 
Brazil, Mexico, Chile and perhaps Argentina. Certain parts of all these 
countries are on about the same level oI education, health, agricultural 
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technique and standard of living as the backward areas in Colombia, Ecuador, 
Peru and Bolivia. For purely psychological reasons, however, the governments 
of the more progressive nations are reluctant to let U. S. technicians work in 
provinces which they themselves have neglected. They accept the U. S. tech-
nical assistance fOT developing civil aviation or arranging public services, 
but not for establishing elementary schoo'Is and rudimentary sanitation in 
remote villages. 
This difficulty could be overcome within the framework of regional projects 
in which technical assistance and economic aid are integrated in the general 
plan. The United States could be called upon to cooperate with the local 
government in developing and executing such plans, supplying technicians, 
certain materials and equipment, while the local go,vemment would pro·vide 
the labor force, the bulk of the technical and supervisory personnel, and 
locally available materials, also assuming the responsibility for high-level 
control over the whole proj ect. A;rrangements of this type may be particularly 
effective in the development of large river basins, iso.lated rural areas and 
continental transportation systems. There is no point, however, in using this 
metho.d for proj ects which can be handled by lo.cal organizations with limited 
economic aid from the United States or the World Bank, such as the Cauca 
Valley development project or expansion of the nationalized petroleum 
industry in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico. 
Expansion of technical assistance activities along these lines would, of 
course, require additional 'appro.priations-perhaps more tJhah the suggested 
doubling of expenditures under present program. The controlling factor will 
be the difficulty in recruiting the necessary persoll1nel. As we have mentioned, 
the Point Four administration has been successful in selecting i,ts personnel 
for work in foreign oountries, with foreign people, under strange and often 
difficult conditions. But Tecruiting such workers and replacing them has be-
come' increasingly difficult. To expand the program, the work of Point Four 
personnel must be made more attractive for those who fit exacting require-
ments. One of the most discussed s()llutions of the problem is to give it a 
permanent status similar to that in the Foreign Service, with the same chances 
of promotion and the same security. * 
Economics and Politics: Economics in Latin America are permeated with 
politics. Many people there consider politics as the most profitable business, 
an·d wealth as the title to political power. These notions, brought to Latin 
America by its former coloni'al masters, proved stronger than the armies 
routed by Bolivar and San Martin. The central issue in the contest between 
the democratic and dictatori,al forms of government is the liberation of the 
continent from these ideas. Democratic governments may be strong or weak, 
oompetent or ignorant, honest or venal; dictators may be benevolent rulers 
or .tyrants; but economic and social progress in this part of the wo.rJd depends 
on elimination of dictatorial regimes and their replacement by democratically 
elected responsible gover~ments. 
* The National Planning Association has made a number of constructive recommendations (or development 
of technical cooperation in Latin America. The author is in agreement with most of its suggestions but would 
supplement them in three directions: integration of technical asaistance and economic aid; emphasis on large . 
• eale projecb and regional planniDg; .ub.tantia! expansion or the program. 
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United States eco,nomic policy in Latin America must take the political 
climate in that 'area into account. Should it support local dictators in recom-
pense for their finn stand against Communism and their benevolence toward 
big business? Should it launch a crusade fOor democracy? Or should it observe 
trict neutrality between the clashing forces? 
The first two lines of policy must be rejected because they would imply 
active intereference of the United States in the internal affairs O'f Latin Ameri-
can countries. On the other hand, the United States canlIlot be completely 
neutral concerning an issue which directly affects the vital interests of the 
whole Western Hemisphere. There must be no ambiguity in the ideological 
attitude of the United States on the issue of democracy vs. dictato:r.ship. Its 
solidarity with the forces of democracy and prQgress in Latin America must 
be clearly expressed, and nQt .only in wO'rds but in deeds and, first O'f all, in the 
orientation of its economic PQlicy. 
The United States oan neither exclude Latin American countries with 
diotatorial governments frQm commodity agreements nor award preferential 
tariffs to cQuntries with democratic regimes. It should nQt Wlithdraw its tech-
nical assist'ance frQm a country because of the change in its political regime, 
but it can give more generous economic aid to democratic oountries as a 
means of strengthening them not only economioally but alsO' politically. It can 
put particular emphasis 0n projects which strengthen inter-American ties, 
and oontribute to the triumph of progressive, dynamic forces over those of 
reaction and st'agnation. It must not use economic 'aid for molding the 
economy of Qther countries according to its own interests but it can use it 
as 'a means for helping the democratic nations 9f Latin Americ,a on the road 
to freedom and independence they have chosen for themselves. 
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APPENDIX 
Basic facts About Latin American· Countries 
The following facts have been gathered by the staff of THE NEW 
LEADER to supplement the stati -tics accompanying Dr. Woytinsky's 
text. For country-by-country figures on per capita and total national 
income, see page 7; distribution of the labor force, page 9; illiteracy, 
page 22; foreign trade, page 26; United States share in trade, page 29; 
U. S. investments, page 32; U. S. technical assistance and ecol1omic 
aid, by country and activity, pages 37 and 38. 
Argentina: Area: 1.1 million sq. mi. Population: 19.8 million. Principal 
cities: Buenos Aires (capital, 3.5 million), Rpsario (467,000), Cordoba 
(450,000). Money: peso, U. S. 5.5c .. Chief crops: Wheat; corn, barley, 
rye, ~inseed, oats, sugar, wine, cotton, animal products. Chief industries: 
meaf-pac~~g, .. flour. milling, shipping. ', Mineral res9urces.: petr,oleum, silver;' 
copper, gold. President: ' Arturo Frondizi, Intransigent Radical, elected 
1958. Recent History: Dictatorship under Juan Peron, established 1 ?43, 
was overthrown in 1955. Provisional Government under General Pedro 
Aramburu, after arranging freely-elected Constituent, Assembly to revise 
Constitution, withdrew in favor of elected President and Congress. 
Bolivia: Area: 419,000 sq. mi. Population: 3.2 million. Principal cities: 
La Paz (capital, 321,000), Cochabamba (80,000). Money: boliviano. 
Chief crops: potatoes, cacao, coffey, barley, highland rice, rubber ' and 
chinchona bark. Chief industry: mining. Mineral resources: tin (15% 
of world output), silver, copper, lead, zinc, antinomy, wolfram, gold, petro-
leum. President: Hernan Siles Zuazo, Nationalist Revolutionary Movement 
(MNR), elected 1956. Recent history: Mass revolution in 1952 overthrew 
military junta and established MNR government under Victor Paz Estens-
soro, which nationalized mines and promoted agrarian reform, economic 
evdirsification, welfare of rural Indians. 
Brazil: Area: 3.2 million sq. mi. Population: 61 million. Principal cities: 
Sao Paulo (3.1 million), Rio de Janeiro (capital, 2.9 million), Salvador 
(523,000), Porto Alegre (504,000). Money: cruzeiro, u.S. 5.4c. Chief 
crops: coffee (supplies 60% of U.S. consumpiton), sugar (world's second 
leading producer), hogs (second leading), cattle, cotton, rice, cocoa, fruit. 
Chief industries: steel, aluminum, cement, manufacturing, aviation. Mineral 
resources: manganese, oil, monazite, gold, mica, oil. President: Juscelino 
Kubitschek, Social Democrat (conservative), elected 1955. Recent history: 
A succession crisis followed the suicide of Getulio Vargas (dictator, 1930-
45 and 1951-54), in which there were three Acting Presidents in 14 months. 
Since the election of Kubitschek, normal democratic processes have been 
restored. Portuguese-speaking. 
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Chile: Area: 286,000 sq. mi. Population: 7 million. Principal cities: ,San" 
tiago (capital, 1.5 million), Valparaiso (222,000). Money: peso, U.S . 
. O·.lc. Chief crops: dairy, wheat, rice, barley, oats, fruits, wine. Chtef in-
dustries: .rpining, steel. Mineral resources: nitrates, copper, iron, cqal, gold, 
silver, .cobalt; zinc, manganese. President: Jorge Alessandri, Liberal-Con · 
s.ervative, elected 1958. R~cent.. h.istpry: . Six-y~ar :pr~~.igency of Gen~ral 
. Carlos 'Ibanez saw efforts to curb rampant inflation. In 1958 Presidential 
. election, .Popular Fr<>nt candic;late placed 'strong second . 
. Colombia Area: 440,000 sq. mi. Population: 13 million. Principal cities: 
Bogota (capital, 1.1 million), Medellin (545,000). Money: peso, U.S. 40c. 
Chief crops: coffee (second largest exporter), rice, tobacco, cotton, cocoa, 
sugar, lumber, rubber. Chief industry: mining. Mineral resources: emeralds, 
gold, silver, copper, lead, petroleum. President: Alberto Lleras Camargo, 
Liberal, elected 1958. Recent history: Conservative-Liberal civil strife 
(1948-53) led to dictatorship of General Rojas Pinilla, overthrown in 
1957. Conserva~ives and Liberals have agreed to 12-year joint admini ... 
stration. 
Costa Rica: Area: 23,000 sq. mi. Population: 1 million. Principal city: 
San Jose (capital, 123,000). Money: colon,. U.S. 15c. Chief crops: coffee, 
bananas, cocoa, abaca, corn, sugar. Chief industries: lumber, mining. M!n-
eral resource$: gold, silver, quartz. President: Dr. Mario Echandi, conser ... 
vative, elected 1958. Recent history: After overthrow of corrupt dic ... 
tatorship in 1948, moderate socialist governments under Otilio Ulate and 
Jose Figueres promoted education, housing, health. 
Cuba: Area: . 44,000 sq. mi . . Population: . 6 million. principal cities: 
Havana (capital, 1.2 million), Holguin (227,000). Mqney: peso, U.S. $1. 
Chief · crops: sugar cane . (world's leading producer), tobacco, molasses, 
coffee,. pineapples, bananas, woods. Chief industries: cigar manufacturing, 
t~xtiles. Mineral resources: iron, copper, manganese, nickel. Dictator: 
Fulgencio Batista, seized power 1952. Recent history: Rebel .movement 
under .Fidel Castro active in eastern part of island since· 1956 . 
. '-Domin'iean Republic: Area: 19,000 sq. mi. Population: 2.6 million. Prin-
cipal city: Ciudad Trujillo (capital, 250,000-called Santo Domingo 
'1496-1936) .. Money: peso, U.S:, $1. .. Chief crops: sugar, cacao, mola~ses, 
coffee, rice, com, tobacco. Chief industries: rum, alcohol, chocolate. M /n-
eral resources: silver, platinum, copper, iron, salt, petroleum. Dictator: 
Rafael L. Trujillo. Recent history: Trujillo, personally and through relatives, 
has ruled since 1930 with the aid of considerable terror against opponents 
at home and abroad . 
. Ecuador: Area: 116,000 sq. mi. Population: 3.7 million. Principal cities: 
Guayaquil (350,000), Quito (capital, 250,000). Money: sucre, U.S. 6.6c . 
. Chief crops: Rice, bananas, cocoa,. balsa wood, cereals, potatoes, fruits, 
co~~. C~ief . i~dustries: cement, edible oils, textiles, h~ts, sugar, che~cal 
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products. Mineral resources: silver, petroleum, copper, iron, lead. President: 
Camilio Ponce Enriquez, Conservative, elected 1956. Recent history: 
First Conservative administration in 60 years, narrowly elected in four-
cornered race, has improved highways, railroads, industry with U.S. aid. 
EI Salvador: Area: 8,000 sq. mi. Population: 2.2 million. Principal cities: 
San Salvador (capital, 194,000), Santa Ana (110,000). Money: colon, 
U .S. 40c. Chief crops: coffee, henequen, sugar, cotton, balsam. Mineral 
resources: gold, silver. President: Lt. Col. Jose Maria Lemus, elected 
unopposed 1956. Recent history: After three democratic postwar years, 
military junta took over in 1948, has dominated ever since. 
Guatemala: Area: 42,000 sq. mi. Population: 3.4 million. Principal 
cities: Guatemala City (capital, 294,000), Quezaltenango (27,000). 
Money: quetzal, U.S. $1. Chief crops: Coffee, bananas, sugar, rice, cotton, 
chicle. Mineral resources: silver, gold, copper, iron, lead, zinc. President: 
General Manuel Y digoras, elected 1958. Recent history: Democratic 
revolution led by Juan Jose Arevalo in 1944 came under pro-Communist 
influence under his successor, Jacobo Arbenz Guzman. He was deposed 
by a coup with U.S. Embassy encouragement under Colonel Carlos Cas-
tillo Armas, who ruled from 1944 until his assassination in 1957. After 
a fraudulent election in 1957 resulted in street demonstrations, new elec-
tions saw conservative Y digoras, with leftist backing, defeat Government 
candidate. 
Haiti: Area: 10,000 sq. mi. Population: 3.3 million. Principal cities: 
Port au Prince (capital, 195,000), Aux Cayes (195,000). Money: gourde, 
U.S. 20c. Chief crops: coffee, sisal, cotton, sugar, bananas, cocoa, tobacco, 
Mineral resources: copper, gold, silver, iron. President: Dr. Fran~ois 
Duvalier, elected 1957. Recent history: Overthrow of corrupt strong-man 
Paul Magloire in 1956 led to long bloody interregnum from which Duvalier, 
with Army support, finally emerged triumphant and repressed his main 
foes. French-speaking. 
Honduras: Area: 43,000 sq. mi. Population: 1.7 million. Principal cities: 
Tegucigalpa (capital, 100,000). Money: lempira, U.S. 50c. Chief crops: 
bananas, coconuts, hardwoods, coffee, tobacco. Mineral resources: gold, 
silver, copper, lead, zinc. President: Dr. Ramon Villeda Morales, Liberal, 
elected 1957. Recent history: Julio Lozano Diaz ruled without Parliament 
from 1954 to 1956, when he was overthrown by military junta, which 
summoned new Constituent Assembly in 1957. 
Mexico: Area: 760,000 sq. mi. Population: 31 million. Principal 'cities: 
Mexico City (capital, 3.8 million), Guadalajara (380,000), Monterrey 
(340,000). Money: peso, U.S. 8c. Chief crops: coffee, sisal (half the 
world's supply), com, rice, sugar, wheat, tobacco, cotton, animal products. 
Chief industries: iron and steel, textiles, flour, beverages, soap, cigarettes 
and cigars, paper and rubber products, handicrafts. Mineral resources: 
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silver (31 % of world production), petroleum, gold, copper, lead, · zinc, 
graphite, molybdenum. President: Adolfo Lopez Mateos, Party of Revolu-
tionary Institutions, elected 1958. Recent history: Since the social revolu-
tion of 1910-17, democracy has operated within the governing party, which 
has elected one-term, six-year Presidents in orderly succession and has 
made steady progress in modernizing the economy. The PRI left wing is 
led by former President Lazaro Cardenas, who nationalized oilwells in 
1937; the right wing by former President Miguel Aleman (1946-52) . 
Nicaragua: Area: 57,000 sq. mi. Population: 1.2 million. Principal 
cities: ~1anagua (capital, 141,941). Money: cordoba, U.S. 7c. Chief crops: 
bananas, coffee, sugar cane, cotton, fruit, animal products. Mineral re-
sources: gold, lumber. Dictator: Luis Somoza, since assas ::: ination of his 
father, dictator Anastasio Somoza, in 1956. Recent history: Better relations 
with neighboring countries and somewhat more civil freedom under son 
than father. 
Panama: Area: 28,000 sq. mi. Population: 947,000. Principal cities: 
Panama City (capital, 127,000), Colon (52,000). Money: balboa, U.S. 
$1. Chief crops: mahogany, bananas, coffee, rice, pineapples, sugar. Chief 
industry: shipping (fourth in world). President: Ernesto de la Guardia Jr., 
elected 1956. Recent history: Split in ruling party, 1957. 
Paraguay: Area: 157,000 sq. mi. Population: 1.6 million. Principal 
cities: Asuncion (capital, 210,000), Encarnacion (33,000). Money: 
guarani , U.S. 0.8c. Chief crops: corn, mandioca, cotton, beans, peanuts, 
tobacco, fruits, livestock. Mineral resources: timber, iron, manganese, cop-
per. Dictator: General Alfredo Stroessner, since 1954. Recent history: 
A five-month civil war in 1947 led to the rule of the Colorados, supported 
by Argentina's Peron. Coups within the ruling party in 1948, 1949 and 
1954. 
Peru: Area: 514,000 sq. mi. Population: 9.7 million. Principal cities: 
Lima (capital, 1 million), Arequipa (120,000). Money: sol, U.S. 5.3c. 
Chief crops: cotton, sugar, wheat, corn, rice, animal products. Mineral 
resources: vanadium, copper, petroleum. President: Dr. Manuel Prado, 
elected 1956. Recent history: Civil strife between APRA (People's party, 
led by Victor Raul Haya de la Torre, with influence in other countries) 
and conservatives led to authoritarian rule after the war. But General 
Manuel A. Odria, strong man 1948-56, yielded to free election which 
chose conservative Prado, whose first act was to legalize APRA and re-
store freedom. 
Uruguay: Area: 72,000 sq. mi. Population: 2.6 million. Principal cities: 
Montevideo (capital, 900,000). Money: peso, U.S. 25c. Chief crops: meat, 
wool, hides, corn, wheat, fruits, rice, tobacco. Chief industries: meat-
packing, textile, wine-making. President: Council system on Swiss model 
since 1951. Recent history: Under the postwar leadership of Luis Battle 
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Berres of the liberal Colorado party, Uruguay has continued to set the pace 
as the most stable and socially-advanced democracy of the Hemisphere. 
Venezuela: Area: 352,150 sq. mi. Population: 6 .million. Principal cities: 
Caracas (capital, 1.1 million), Maracaibo (390,000). Money: bolivar, 
u.s. 29.9c. Chief crops: coffee, sugar, cacao, livestock. Chief Industries: 
mining. Mineral resources: petroleum, iron, gold, copper, coal, salt, tin, 
manganese. President (provisional): Admiral Wolfgang Larrazabal, led 
junta formed in 1958. Recent history: Military coup in 1948 ousted Demo-
cratic Action administration under Romulo Gallegos, established dictator-
ship of General Marcos Perez Jimenez, which worked closely with foreign 
petroleum interests. Popular revolution in 1958 established provisional 
junta, restored civil liberties. Presidential election scheduled for December 
7, 1958. 
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